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INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Partnership Act 1 is part and parcel of the work
of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws designed to achieve
as far as possible a single set of legal principles for the entire
country in the area of commercial law. Under the direction of the
Commissioners, the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act,2 the Uni-
form Sales Act,3 the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act,4 and the Uni-
form Bills of Lading Act 5 had previously been drafted and recom-
mended for adoption.
Partnership law as a part of commercial law would seem peculi-
arly susceptible to uniform treatment. At common law not only
are there diverse results in different states on many partnership
problems, but there often exist confusion of theory and conflict of
decision within a single jurisdiction. Then too, the courts of most
jurisdictions have not spoken on many vital issues. Furthermore,
there appears to be no outstanding local policy to obstruct the way
of uniformity.
A necessary incident to uniformity is codification, and an
obviously desirable approach is the embodiment, so far as prac-
ticable, of principles already existent in the common law. Accord-
ingly the Act, for the most part, is a restatement of those common-
law principles that prevail throughout the decisions of most states.
Only in a few instances does it deviate; and in most of these the
principle expressed had previously been enunciated by the courts
of at least one jurisdiction.
Work on the Act was commenced in 1902. James Barr Ames,
Dean of the Law School of Harvard University, was employed to
make the original draft. Careful consideration was given its prep-
aration. In 1909, it had reached the state of a Second Tentative
* Professor of Law, College of Law, The Ohio State University; Author
of the Chapter on Partnership in Ohio Jurisprudence. 30 OHIO JuR. 975.
** Associate Professor of Law, College of Law, The Ohio State Univer-
sity.
1 Referred to throughout this paper as THE "ACT."
2Proposed for adoption in 1896.
3 Proposed for adoption in 1906.
4Proposed for adoption in 1906.
Proposed for adoption in 1909.
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Draft. Then Dean Ames died. In 1910, Dr. Wm. Draper Lewis,
then Dean of the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania,
was requested to proceed with the work. Both draftsmen drew on
the English Partnership Act of 1890 for large portions of their work
just as the draftsmen of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act
and the Uniform Sales Act had drawn on the previous English codi-
fications of those areas of the commercial law. Finally in October,
1914, the Commissioners approved the Act and recommended its
adoption. No previous Uniform Act had had so much time devoted
to its preparation.
Appropriately enough, Pennsylvania, where Dean Lewis had
done most of the work on the Act was the first state to adopt it.
This was on July 1, 1915.6 Wisconsin followed five days later.7 But
by 1920, only twelve states or territories had adopted it.8 Five more
adopted it in the twenties 9 and three in the thirties.10 The Act was
not receiving the reception that had been accorded other Uniform
Acts dealing with commercial law subjects. However, in the forties
a resurgence occurred. Eight states adopted the Act, three of these
adoptions being in 1947.11 It is now in force in twenty-eight states
and territories.
Since the Act has been in effect in some jurisdictions for over
thirty years, there now exists a considerable body of judicial de-
cision by which to test it in operation. This material will be of
substantial aid to any legislature having its adoption under consid-
eration, and ultimately to the courts of any state which may now
enact it.12 This is particularly true in view of Section 4(4) of the
Act which states that it "shall be so interpreted and construed as to
effect its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states
which enact it."
The Act has been previously introduced in either one or both
"PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 59, §§ 1-105 (1930).
7 WIS. STAT. §§ 123.01-123.38 (1945).
8 Besides Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, they were: Alaska (1917);
Idaho (1920); Illinois (1917); Maryland (1916); Michigan (1917); New Jer-
sey (1919); New York (1919); Tennessee (1917); Virginia (1918); Wyoming
(1917).
9 California (1929); Massachusetts (1923); Minnesota (1921); South
Dakota (1923); Utah (1921).
10 Colorado (1931); Nevada (1931); Oregon (1939).
"Arkansas (1941); Delaware (1947); Montana (1947); Nebraska
(1943); New Mexico (1947); North Carolina (1941); Vermont (1941);
Washington (1945). Undoubtedly an increased use of the partnership form
of business because of heavy corporate taxes during the war caused the
revival of interest in the Act.
'
2 Williams, The Uniform Partnership Act Comes to Nebraska, 22 NEB.
L. REv. 215, 251 (1943).
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of the houses of the General Assembly of Ohio.' 3 It is the purpose
of this article to indicate the changes that would be made in the
present law of Ohio, both common law and statute, if the Act were
to be finally adopted here today.14
THE LEGAL THEORY OF Tm ACT
Much discussion has been devoted to the nature of the partner-
ship relation.15 Is a partnership a separate legal entity or juristic
person distinct from the individuals who compose its membership?
Or is it merely the group attributes of those individuals, the partner-
ship as such having no separate rights and duties? The first view
is known as the entity or mercantile view, and is accepted in the
civil-law countries; the second is ordinarily referred to as the ag-
gregate or common-law theory.
To describe a partnership as an entity is admittedly to indulge
in a fiction. As convenient means to ends, fictions can and do often
serve useful purposes. But in them there ever lurks the danger that
the means will in time come to be thought of as itself the end, that
in the thinking of lawyers and courts the fiction will replace reality
and will give rise to a new and difficult set of problems of its own.
This has oftentimes happened in corporation law.'
Regardless of the tendency in common parlance to treat "the
firm" as if it had an existence apart from its members, the Ohio
13 The latest occasion was H. B. 289, 97th General Assembly of Ohio,
reported favorably from Judiciary Committee of the House.
:L There is considerable law review literature indicating the effect of
the Act on the previously existing partnership law of particular states.
Richards, The Uniform Partnership Act, 1 Wis. L. REV. 5, 90 (1920) (Wis-
consin law); Trotter, The Uniform Partnership Act and Its Effect Upon the
West Virginia Decisions and Statutes, 27 W. VA. L. Q. 28, 158 (1920); Note,
The Uniform Partnership Act-New York's Failure to Adopt It, 18 COL. L.
REV. 582 (1918); Wright, California Partnership Law and the Uniform Part-
nership Act, 9 CALIF. L. REV. 117, 206, 306, 391 (1921); Ballantine, Adoption
of Uniform Partnership Act in California, 17 CALIF. L. REV. 623 (1929);
Williams, The Uniform Partnership Act Comes to Nebraska, 22 NEB. L. REV.
215 (1943); Uniform Partnership Law with Oregon Notes, 19 ORE. L. REV.
190 (1940), 20 ORE. L. REV. 96 (1940), 22 ORE. L. REV. 207 (1942).
5 Drake, Partnership Entity and Tenancy in Partnership: The Struggle
for a Definition, 15 MicH. L. REV. 609 (1917); Cowles, The Firm as a Legal
Person, 57 CENT. L. J. 343 (1903); Burdick, Some Judicial Myths, 22 HARv.
L. REV. 393 (1909); WARREN, COPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORA-
TION C. II (1929); Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YALE L. J. 617
(1915); Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act, A Criticism, 28 HARv. L. REV.
762 (1915); Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. Crane's
Criticism, 29 HARV. L. REV. 158, 291 (1915, 1916); Crane, The Uniform Part-
nership Act and Legal Persons, 29 HARV. L. REV. 838 (1916); Note, 41
COL. L. REV. 698 (1941).
26 Old Dominion Copper Mining and Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210
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cases overall have taken the aggregate position.17 It must be ad-
mitted that occasional language implies recognition of an entity, but
usually this is used in a context wherein the court is distinguishing
between the business in which persons engage as partners, and that
which they carry on as individual undertakings. 8 Further, Ohio
by statute does permit partnerships to sue and be sued in their firm
names.19 This, of course, is inconsistent with the aggregate view
since under the latter the partnership as such has no capacity to sue
or be sued; suits must be brought by and against the partners
jointly as individuals.20  As a matter of fact, suits may now be
brought by or against all jointly, or the firm as such, or both to-
gether. This is but a matter of procedure in respect to parties
litigant. In no respect does it qualify the substantive nature of the
relation.
2
'
U.S. 206 (1908). See Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Connecticut General
Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 83 (1938).
"7Byers v. Schlupe, 51 Ohio St. 300, 38 N.E. 117 (1894); McMillen v.
Industrial Commission, 13 Ohio App. 310, 32 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 285 (1920);
Ford v. State, 11 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 324 (1908), aff'd without opinion, 80 Ohio
St. 722, 89 N.E. 1125 (1909); Du Pont du Nemours Powder Co. v. Jones Bros.,
200 Fed. 638 (S.D. Ohio 1912). See Barger-Mitchell Motor Co. v. Levy, 34
Ohio App. 84, 170 N.E. 443 (1929).
18 In Andres v. Morgan, 62 Ohio St. 236, 244, 56 N.E. 875, 877 (1900) it is
stated that "A partnership is a quasi legal entity. It owns property and has
liabilities as such." This statement is made to demonstrate that partnership
property is subject to the debts of firm creditors and that the property can-
not be fraudulently conveyed so as to defeat the rights of the firm creditors.
It does not indicate that the partnership is a separate juristic person but
stands for the proposition that the assets of the partners devoted to the
partnership business must answer to those who deal with partners as such.
In United States Printing and Lithographing Co. v. Crites, 15 Ohio App. 63
(1921), motion to certify overruled, 19 Ohio L. Rep. 466 (Sup. Ct. 1921) the
court held that a contract to furnish all labels needed by a partnership
terminated when the partnership business was sold by the partners and
that the contract was not one to furnish the individual partners all the
labels they needed in whatever enterprise they might be engaged. A busi-
ness apart from the separate undertakings of the partners was recognized
but not as a juristic person or legal unit. But see West v. The Valley Bank,
6 Ohio St. 168 (1856); First National Bank v. Cochran, 8 Ohio N.P. 696
(1901); Deglow v. Kruse, 2 Ohio N.P. 235 (1894).
19 Oaro Gm. CODE § 11260 (1938).
2 0  
McEn, ELEmENTs OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSEPI § 328 (2d ed. 1920);
BuxC, THE LAW OF PAuTlmSEIn c. HI (2d ed. 1906).
21 In Whitman v. Keith, 18 Ohio St. 134, 144 (1868) it is stated that
"The purpose of this statute was to give to every partnership of the kind
which it describes, a status in court as a person, an artificial or ideal per-
son... ." (Emphasis supplied.) Barger-Mitchell Motor Co. v. Levy, 34 Ohio
App. 84, 170 N. E. 443 (1929), Ungerleider v. Ewers, 20 Ohio App. 79, 153
N.E. 191 (1925), motion to certify overruled, 23 Ohio L. Rep. 589 (Sup. Ct.
1925). One Ohio case has broadly stated that the effect of the statute is to
make the partnership an entity in substance as well as procedure. First
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The Act's original draftsman, Dean Ames, was a supporter of
the entity theory. He prepared several drafts based on that ap-
proach. After the death of Dean Ames, Dean Lewis submitted two
drafts to the Commissioners, one based on each view. Experts from
the practice and teaching field were called in. It was thereupon
unanimously decided to adopt the aggregate approach as the one
which would cause the least disruption in existing law. 2 2
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PARTNERSHIP RELATION
The most frequently litigated problem in the law of partnership
occurs at the very threshold: what set of facts constitutes a part-
nership? It has never been questioned since the famous opinions
of the Law Lords in 1860 in Cox v. Hickman2 3 that the field of law
we now label "partnership" is but a branch of the law of agency.
Indeed, it was Lord Cranworth's relegation of profit sharing to the
position of evidence of the ultimate fact of agency that has made
that case a landmark in English and American common law. Six-
teen years later, the Supreme Court Commission of Ohio expressed
this same basic principle in the words ". . . the foundation of the
liability of one partner for the acts of another is the relation they
sustain to each other, as being each principal and agent.*** The
true test of a partnership relation, at last, is left to be that of the
relation of the parties as principal and agent." _4
While the Act 25 makes sharing in profits prima facie evidence
of the partnership relation, instead of "cogent often conclusive"
evidence of the agency relation as stated in Cox v. Hickman, the dif-
ference would seem more in vocabulary than in substance. The Act
defines a partnership as "an association of two or more persons tc
National Bank v. Cochran, 8 Ohio N.P. 696 (1901). The cases cited, note I1i
supra, indicate that such is not the effect of the statute. The Act by it!
reaffirmance of the aggregate theory as a matter of substantive law would
of course, have no effect on General Code Section 11260 which is a matte]
of procedure.
22When Nebraska adopted the Uniform Partnership Act in 1943, i
adopted the entity theory by substituting in Section 6 (1) of the Act ",
partnership is an association of persons organized as a separate entity tf
carry on business for profit." NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-306 (1943). A commen
tator on the Nebraska Act was doubtful that the difference in definitioi
would affect the result of cases. Williams, The Uniform Partnership Ac
Comes to Nebraska, 22 NEB. L. REV. 215, 219 (1943).
23 8 H.L. Cas. 268, 11 Eng. Rep. 431 (1860).
24 Harvey v. Childs, 28 Ohio St. 319, 321, 322 (1876). Some later Ohii
cases adopting this test are: Valentine v. Hickle, 39 Ohio St. 19 (1883)
Southern Ohio Pub. Service Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 115 Ohii
St. 405, 154 N.E. 365 (1926); Goubeaux v. Krickenberger, 126 Ohio St. 30d
185 N.E. 201 (1933).
25 THE ACT § 7 (4).
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carry on as co-owners a business for profit," 2 and Ohio has paral-
leled with "a contract of an association by which two or more con-
tribute money, goods, or labor, to the end that the profit may be
ratably divided between them."2 7 The same insubstantial difference
is discernible here. Again, both the Act and the Ohio cases have
been at pains to contrast certain other relationships which are char-
acteristically difficult to distinguish from partnerships.
Thus the Act states that no "inference of a prima facie case
should be drawn if such profits were received in payment" of a
debt, as wages or rent, as an annuity to a deceased'partner's widow,
as interest on a loan, or as consideration for the sale of good will or
other property.28 Further, the sharing of gross returns as distin-
guished from profits "does not of itself establish a partnership."2
Counterparts of most of these elaborations will be found in the Ohio
cases. °
As a practical matter, therefore, and disregarding occasional
trivial verbiage, the Act does not in this respect change the sub-
stantive law of Ohio. Its contribution is not insignificant, however,
since its expression is more concise and unequivocal than can be
found in the sum total of the many Ohio cases.2 '
Thus far nothing has been said to indicate that it makes a dif-
ference whether a third person is claiming that a partnership rela-
tion exists or whether one of the alleged partners himself makes
such a claim. One Ohio case has suggested that even in the absence
of estoppel parties might be partners as to third persons though not
26 THE AcT § 6 (1).
27 Aspinwall v. Williams, 1 Ohio 84, 95 (1823).
28 THE AcT §7 (4).
29 THE ACT §7 (3).
.30 Coleman v. LaBounty Amusement Co., 21 Ohio App. 44, 153 N.E. 90
(1925), motion to certify overruled June 23, 1925, (sharing portion of gross
receipts as rent). See Wood v. Vallette, 7 Ohio St. 172 (1857) (sharing in
gross profits does not establish partnership). Cf. Mosier v. Parry, 60 Ohio
St. 388, 54 N.E. 364 (1899) (position of vendor excludes concept of partner-
ship with vendee). But see Second National Bank v. Messinger, 13 Ohio
C.C. 561, 6 Ohio C.D. 197 (1895) (creditor held liable as partner).
It should be further noted that the Act also enumerates "joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, tenancy by the entireties, joint property, common prop-
erty or part ownership" as "not of itself" establishing a partnership,
"whether such owners do or do not share any profits made by use of the
property." THE ACT § 7 (2). Several Ohio nisi prius decisions involving co-
ownership cases are to the same effect, but the issue is rarely raised. For
full discussion see LnDmLEY, PARTNERSHIP 27, 31-33 (10th ed. 1935).
31 A critic of the Act takes the position that the Act has sharpened the
tools which the courts use to determine the existence of a partnership.
Crane, Twenty Years Under the Uniform Partnership Act, 2 U. oF Prrr. L.
REv. 120 (1936).
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so among themselves.2 No Ohio case, however, actually has so held,
and the Act expressly repudiates this possibility.3
It is apparent, however, that under certain circumstances a
partnership, just as an agency, may be found to exist as to third
persons although none exists as between the parties. This, of course,
rests upon the doctrine of estoppel; and occasions the recognition of
what is sometimes called an "apparent" as distinguished from an
actual relationship. It is not founded on the actual presence of the
indicia discussed above; but on the broad proposition of law that
even in the absence of such facts, a person who creates or who
knows of the existence of a false impression is under such a moral
responsibility as to justify his being treated as though the im-
pression were in fact true. 4 The application of this principle is
restricted to such persons as have been misled into reasonable re-
liance on this appearance, for only these are the victims of irre-
sponsibility.35
Under the Act, partnership liability can only exist where a per-
son represents himself to be or consents to the representation of
himself as a member of an existing partnership." If the representa-
tion is that he is a partner of one or more persons who are not part-
ners, then a joint liability exists rather than a partnership liabilityY'
Since, as will be seen, a partner's contractual obligation is joint any-
way,3 8 there is no practical difference as to the existence of this
liability as a matter of substantive law in the two types of cases.
On the other hand there may be a substantial difference in the
priorities involved in the distribution of assets in a court of equity
32Wood v. Vallette, 7 Ohio St. 172, 178 (1857). See Daly v. Savage, 12
Ohio App. 471, 473 (1920).
33 THE ACT § 7 (1).
3 Reber & Kutz v. Columbus Machine Mfg. Co., 12 Ohio St. 175 (1861);
Speer v. Bishop, 24 Ohio St. 598 (1874); Cook v. Penrhyn Co., 36 Ohio St.
135 (1880); Russell v. Fenner, 21 Ohio C.C. 527, 11 Ohio C.D. 754 (1901);
Pastor v.'Rosenbaum, 12 Ohio L. Abs. 486 (App. 1932). Occasional decisions
elsewhere have asserted an affirmative duty to "do all that a reasonable
and honest man should do, under similar circumstances" to repudiate the
false impression. Fletcher v. Pullen, 70 Md. 205, 16 Atl. 887 (1889); Note,
1918D L.R.A. 505. The Commissioners have viewed Ohio as of this
opinion, but an examination of the cases fails to show recognition, it is
believed, of such an affirmative obligation. The Commissioners in their note
to Section 7 of the Act [7 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 24 (1938)] cite Speer v.
Bishop, 24 Ohio St. 598 (1874). It would appear, however, that the Supreme
Court in that case was of the opinion that the defendant had in fact con-
sented to the use of his name by his son. Dignan v. Brandon Oil Co., 49 N.E.
2d 576 (Ohio App. 1931) supports the view that a person falsely repre-
sented as a partner is under no duty to repudiate that representation. The
Act, Section 16 (1) is in agreement.
'Is Sohn v. Freiberg & Freiberg, 6 Ohio Dec. Rep. 1175 (Dist. Ct. 1883).
31 Tam ACT § 16.37 THE ACT §16 (1) (b) and (2).
38 THE ACT § 15 (b).
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in the event of insolvency. This will be discussed in a later section
dealing with that question. 9
Once a partnership has been established, it continues to exist.
for the duration of the undertaking specified in the agreement or for
the definite term agreed upon unless earlier dissolved.4 0 Most part-
nerships are at will and thus may be terminated at any time by
any partner without liability.4' The Act provides that, where a
partnership for a fixed term or particular undertaking is continued
after the termination of such term or particular undertaking, the
partnership becomes one at will and is not automatically brought
to an end by the expiration of the fixed period or culmination of the
particular undertaking.42
THE EFFECT OF THE AcT ON EXISTING PARTNERSHIPS AND OTHER FoRMs
OF PARTNERSHIP
The Act provides that it "shall not be construed so as to impair
the obligations of any contract existing when the act goes into ef-
fect." 4 Since the partnership relation is contractual, it is clear that
this provision protects all pre-existing partnerships. However, cer-
tain provisions to be discussed later-such as real estate conversion,
dissolution, winding up, charging order, and the application of as-
sets to the payment of debts-have already been construed in some
jurisdictions to apply to partnerships existing at the effective date
of the Act.44
39 The foregoing discussion has related to general partnership. Such
specialized varieties as joint stock companies, mining partnership and one
type of business trust will be discussed in the section immediately to follow.
40 See Scott v. Clark, 1 Ohio St. 382 (1853); Jones v. Jones, Ohio C.C.
260, 10 Ohio C.D. 71 (1898); THE ACT § 31 (1) (a).
-" See Eagle v. Bucher, 6 Ohio St. 295, 300 (1856); TE ACT § 31 (1) (b);
§ 23 (1).
42 Tu ACT § 23 (1). This situation appears not to have been commented
upon in any Ohio case.
43 TnE ACT § 4 (5).
4"Wharf v. Wharf, 306 Ill. 79, 137 N.E. 446 (1922), involving change in
Illinois law brought about by Act treating all real property of partnership
-as converted into personal property "out and out" rather than merely to
extent needed for partnership debts. The court held this applied to a firm
formed in 1911. The firm had bought the property in question in 1911 and
had dissolved in A821, four years after the passage of the Act in Illinois.
The case is criticized in 10 Corn. L. Q. 72 (1925); Froess v. Froess, 284 Pa.
369, 131 Atl. 276 (1925) (dissolution and winding up provisions of the Act
applied to a partnership formed before passage of the Act in Pennsylvania);
Crossman v. Gibney, 164 Wis. 395, 160 N.W. 172 (1916) (holding to the
same effect in Wisconsin). See Hobbs v. Virginia Nat. Bank of Petersburg,
147 Va. 802, 128 S.E. 46 (1925) (raising question as to whether Section 16
of Act applied to holding out of defendant as partner prior to and after
passage of Act in Virginia). In Gerding v. Baier, 143 Md. 520, 122 Atl. 675
<1923) the court held that in view of Section 4 (5) of Act a provision con-
1948]
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It must be borne in mind also that the term "partnership" in-
cludes joint stock companies, mining partnerships, and a certain type
of business trust.4 5 Thus, a joint stock company is essentially a
partnership with transferable shares. This negates the usual char-
acteristic of delectus personae and as a logical necessity precludes
dissolution by transfer either inter vivos or at death. Ordinarily,
the number of shareholders is large; and as a matter of administra-
tive convenience, the management is entrusted to a group chosen
by the membership and having exclusive authority to bind the con-
cern.4 6 Although the creature of statute in a few states,47 in Ohio
these are common-law partnerships resting on contract. 48 The term
business, or Massachusetts, trust has been indiscriminately applied
to two types of relationships, both originating from contract and
both having trust features with transferable shares representing
equitable rather than legal interests. One of these is in reality a
variety of joint stock company, the other is not, but is a true trust
and need not concern us here. The difference lies in the presence or
absence of an agency, which in turn depends upon whether the prac-
tical control over the trustee rests in the shareholders or not.4 9 Since
partnership is but an aspect of the law of agency, it is apparent that
only the former variety is classifiable as a partnership, or more
accurately, in view of the transferable shares, as a joint stock com-
pany. Like most states, Ohio has recognized the validity of both
forms of organization."°
tained in the partnership agreement executed before passage of Act in
Maryland would be enforced.
45Brief note should be made of another relationship referred to in the
cases as "joint adventures." The early Ohio view was that these consti-
tuted merely a variety of partnership. Yeoman v. Leshy, 40 Ohio St. 190
(1883); Halett v. Fairbanks, 40 Ohio St. 233 (1883). However, the latest
pronouncement of the Ohio Supreme Court treats a joint adventure as a
special combination of natural or artificial persons who without creating
a partnership combine in the conduct of some particular business for profit.
Bennett v. Sinclair Refining Co., 144 Ohio St. 139 (1944). For purposes of
this paper, it is sufficient to say that the Act will affect joint adventurers to
the extent that the courts determine that the rules applicable to partner-
ship apply to them. See Geisenhoff v. Mabrey, 58 Cal. App. 2d 481, 137 P.
2d 36 (1936).
46 For characterization of joint stock company, see Platt v. Colvin,
50 Ohio St. 703, 36 N.E. 735 (1893); MEcHEM, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF
PARTNERSHIP § 35 (2d ed. 1920).
47 E.g., N. Y. GEN. Ass'Ns LAw § 4.
48 McFadden v. Luka, 48 Ohio St. 513, 28 N.E. 874 (1891).
49 State Street Trust Co. v. Hall, 311 Mass. 299, 41 N.E. 2d 30 (1942);
WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION 327 et seq. (1929).
so The joint stock company variety of business trust is recognized in
Goubeaux v. Krickenberger, 126 Ohio St. 302, 185 N.E. 201 (1933). There
was at one time serious question as to the validity of the true business or
Massachusetts trust in the State of Ohio. See 1919 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. (Ohio)
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A mining partnership results when tenants in common of min-
ing property cooperate to develop the property for profit. It differs
from a co-tenancy in the presence of agency and profit sharing. It
differs from a general partnership in that there exists a tenancy in
common in the mining property without the usual characteristics of
partnership realty, the scope of implied agency is narrow and the
shares of members are transferable. Though similar to a joint stock
company it is limited to co-tenancies in mining or oil enterprises.5 1
The Act does not mention joint stock companies, business trusts
or mining partnerships. In fact, many provisions of the Act are
obviously incompatible with the characteristic of transferability of
shares, a feature common to all three relationships.5 2 Since these
are specialized varieties of partnerships and since the Act makes no
provision for them, it can be argued that enactment of the Act im-
pliedly precludes their existence. The legal literature on the Act
and the Commissioners' Notes are noncommittal on this issue. No-
where is there a reference to these types of partnership. That in
itself is persuasive that the Act was intended merely to deal with
ordinary general partnerships, and not with these specialized types.
This reasoning is supported by a Massachusetts decision rendered
after the effective date of the Act in that state which holds that the
Act does not apply to the sort of business trust wherein the mem-
bers are liable as partners. This conclusion is applied to the extent
at least that the Act is inconsistent with the contract terms of the
business trust. Specifically, it was held in State Street Trust Co. v.
Hall 1 3 that the provisions of the Act permitting a partner to dis-
solve the partnership even though the term of the partnership had
not expired 5 4 did not apply to a business trust in the nature of a
partnership. It would appear, therefore, that the enactment of the
Act in Ohio would not prevent the continued existence and further
creation of joint stock companies, mining partnerships, and business
trusts wherein the members are liable as partners. The Act may
well be applicable, however, to those forms of business to the extent
that they are already subject to general partnership law under the
common law. Their peculiar characteristics would not however be
affected.
Ohio statutory law already prlovides for two specialized types
No. 575, No. 597. The validity of that type of business organization seems
now to be established. State ex Tel. Stuart v. Meyer, 19 Ohio App. 136, 24
Ohio L. Rep. 273 (1925); 1931 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. (Ohio) No. 3438.
51 For characteristics of mining partnership, see Ervin v. Masterman,
16 Ohio C.C. 62, 8 Ohio C.D. 516 (1898); MEcHEm, ELEMENTS OF THE LAw OF
PARTNERSHIP § 37 (2d ed. 1920).
52E. g., THE ACT §§ 25 (2) (d), 31, 32.
53 311 Mass. 299, 41 N.E. 2d 30 (1942).
54 THE ACT § 31 (2).
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of partnerships not included under the category of general part-
nerships covered by the Act. Each of these is purely a creature of
statute and differs chiefly in the degree of personal liability to which
their members are subjected. One of these, limited partnerships,5
is expressly made subject to the Act, "except in so far as the statutes
relating to such [limited] partnerships are inconsistent herewith." 56
The other, partnership associations," would seem clearly excluded
from operation of the Act by the reference to "any association
formed under any other statute" as "not a partnership under this
act.""8
Another aspect of the effect of the Act on other forms of busi-
ness organizations relates to the capacity of a corporation to be a
partner. The term "person" under the Act includes "individuals,
partnerships, corporations, and other associations." 59 As heretofore
stated, the Act defines a partnership as an association of "two or
more persons. '60 Therefore, as far as the Act is concerned there is
nothing to prevent a corporation from being a member of a part-
nership. On the contrary, the authority is expressly provided. This
does not necessarily mean, however, that as a matter of corporation
law a corporation may become a partner for basically the capacity
and authority of a corporation is a matter of corporation law. Under
Ohio law, at least, since the Corporation Code of 1927 as amended,6
corporations have all the authority of natural persons; 62 it would
seem that a corporation might have the capacity to become a part-
ner. This, however, would be true whether or not the Act is passed.
While no case has been found denying a corporation the capacity to
become a partner since the enactment of the Corporation Code,
decisions prior to that time forbade corporations this capacity. 3
55 OHIo GEN. CODE §§ 8036-8058 (1938).
56T ACT §6 (2).
57 Ono GEN. CODE §§ 8059-8078 (1938).
58THE ACT § 6 (2).
59 THE ACT § 2.
rOTHE ACT § 6.
61 OHio GEN. CODE § 8623 (1938).
620= o GEN. CODE § 8623-8 (1938).
63 Merchants' National Bank v. Standard Wagon Co., 65 Ohio St. 559,
63 N.E. 1124 (1901), without opinion; Geurinch v. Alcott, 66 Ohio St. 94, 63
N.E. 714 (1902). One of the historic reasons used in arriving at this result
is that to permit a corporation to become a partner would be in violation
of statutes vesting the management of a corporation in the board of direc-
tors. The Merchants' National Bank v. The Standard Wagon Company, 6
Ohio N.P. 264, 9 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 380, aff'd, 7 Ohio N.P. 539, 10 Ohio Dec.
(N.P.) 81, aff'd without opinion, 65 Ohio St. 559, 63 N.E. 1124 (1901). Sec-
tion 8623-55 of the Ohio General Code vests the management of Ohio
corporations in the board of directors.
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The Act might well be a fortifying link for a new chain of thought
as to corporate capacity. 4
AuTHor= A= SCOPE
The essence of partnership is the mutual agency of all the part-
ners to bind each other jointly on all contracts within the scope of
the partnership business.8 5 This authority, of course, falls into the
conventional categories long recognized in the mother field of
agency. Thus a partner not only has whatever express authority
has been conferred upon him by his co-partners, but has in addi-
tion whatever authority may be implied as incidental to or as neces-
sary for such authority or as may be implied from custom or usage. 6
An act of a partner for which authority cannot be found in the agree-
ment or implied from any of these circumstances is not binding upon
his co-partners; it is not, in short, a partnership act. None of these
agency principles has been changed by the Act. In fact they are
specifically incorporated in it.
This is due to the express recognition in the Act of the appli-
cation of the law of agency,67 and to the broad statement of agency
powers set forth in four propositions: (1) that every partner is agent
for the firm for all acts apparently in the usual course of firm busi-
ness, unless no authority in fact exists to the knowledge of the third
person;68 (2) that an act not apparently for such purposes does not
bind unless authorized; 9 (3) that certain acts are not binding unless
authorized or performed by all the partners, except in case they
have abandoned the business; 0 and (4) that no act in contravention
of a restriction on authority shall bind the partnership to persons
with knowledge of the restriction.7'
64 See Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Pope, 178 Tenn. 580, 586, 161 S.W.
2d 211, 213 (1941), aff'd, 315 U.S. 649 (1942), holding that a foreign natural
gas company had such an interest in division of profits received by local
power company, that the gas company was liable for state excise tax. In
dicta the court stated that the language of the Act then in effect in Tennes-
see indicated that a corporation may be a partner.
c5 See text page 620 supra.
6" McGrath v. Cowen, 57 Ohio St. 385, 49 N.E. 338 (1898); Union Nat.
Bank v. Wickham, 18 Ohio C.C. 685, 6 Ohio C.D. 790 (1894).
67 THE ACT § 4 (3).
0 8 Tn ACT § 9 (1).69 THE ACT § 9 (2).
70 Tmi. ACT § 9 (3).
71 TnE ACT § 9 (4). The agency parallel is found in the contrast be-
tween mere instructions and a limitation of authority. Van Santvoord v.
Smith, 79 Minn. 316, 82 N.W. 642 (1900); American Lead Pencil Co. v.
Wolfe, 30 Fla. 360, 11 So. 488 (1892); Law v. Stokes, 32 N.J.L. 249 (1867);
Hatch v. Taylor, 10 N.H. 538 (1840).
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With possibly two minor exceptions, 2 these principles either
state or are consistent with present Ohio decisions. The Act's con-
tribution here is in terms of clarity of expression rather than of
novelty or variation of substance.
From the standpoint of tort liability of partners the Act likewise
makes no change. The traditional joint and several liability of part-
ners for torts committed by co-partners, employees, agents or serv-
ants, within the partnership scope is clearly reflected not only in the
statement in Section 4 (3) that "The law of agency shall apply un-
der this act," but again in Section 13, and more particularly in Sec-
tion 15 (a) where the liability described in Section 13 is expressly
stated to be joint and several.7 3
NATURE OF PARTNERSHIP LIABiLITY
Thus as accurate an epitome of the present state of Ohio law
as can be formulated is perhaps that the substantive contract li-
ability of partners for obligations incurred within the scope of the
partnership business, is still essentially joint in its nature, but that
procedurally speaking, there have been superimposed by statute a
series of attributes more akin to a joint and several relationship.
The mystic quality of "jointness" makes all joint obligors neces-
72 a. In Wilcox v. Singletary, Wright 420 (1833) the Ohio Supreme
Court held that one partner has implied authority to submit a disputed
partnership claim to arbitration. The Act denies this authority to less than
all the partners in Section 9 (3) (e).
b. THE ACT § 9 (3) (a) and one Ohio case, Holland & Pettitt v. Drake,
29 Ohio St. 441 (1876) agree that less than all the partners have ordinarily
no implied authority to make an assignment for the benefit of creditors.
Another Ohio case, however, permits one partner to make an assignment for
benefit of creditors if he can prove that the absent partner is inaccessible
for consultation. H. B. Clafflin Co. v. Evans, 55 Ohio St. 183, 45 N.E. 3
(1896). Section 9 (3) of the Act permits less than all of the partners to
make such an assignment where the non-assenting partner has abandoned
the business. Literally, therefore, the Act appears to do away with the ex-
ception permitted by Ohio case law. This would be unfortunate in the rare
case where a partner was inaccessible but had not abandoned the business.
It is believed that under Sections 4 (3) and 5 of the Act a court could apply
the existing Ohio exception.
73 While it is clear from Sections 13, 14 and 15 (a) of the Act that part-
ners are jointly and severally liable for the torts of one of the partners
committed in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership, the
Act is not explicit as to the nature of the liability of the partners when the
tortious act is committed by an employee of the partnership in the ordi-
nary course of business. Judicial construction of the Act in other states
has viewed this liability of the partners as joint and several also, just as
it was at common law. Weaver v. Marcus, 165 F. 2d 862 (C.C.A. 4th 1948);
Soberg v. Sanders, 243 Mich. 429, 220 N.W. 781 (1928); Note, 34 VA. L. REV.
614 (1948).
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sary parties in actions at law,7 4 makes each liable for all with a
secondary right of contribution, 5 and entails the concept of sur-
vivorship of obligation when sued upon on the law side of the
court.7 6 Equity's more lenient rules as to parties, plus its ready con-
version of joint into joint and several obligations at death has long
been another story.7 7
As has been seen, partnership torts have traditionally been joint
and several,78 and consequently by their very nature have provided
plaintiffs both at law and in equity with alternative choice of
parties.7 9 Further, even though survivorship operates as to its joint
aspect, that aspect of the obligation that is several becomes the li-
ability of the deceased partner's estate.8 0
The statutory changes in Ohio have affected substantive rights
to some small degree, procedural aspects markedly. The Probate
Code has converted joint obligations into joint and several at death
in actions at law as well as in equity.8' While suits against partners
in contract actions still require the initial joinder of all, 2 the statute
now permits the action to proceed to judgment against less than
all even though some have not been served with process.8 3 These
latter, if later served, may thereafter be made parties to that judg-
ment. 14
Levy of execution in the case of joint obligors at common law
would lie against the property of any one of those served.85  While
this remains true in Ohio, a statute has added the right to levy upon
the joint property as well even where all defendants are not indi-
74 Choteau v. Raitt, 20 Ohio 132, 144 (1851).
75 Gaylord, Son & Co. v. Imhoff & Co., 26 Ohio St. 317 (1875).
76 Beach v. Hayward, 10 Ohio 455 (1841). See Well v. Guerin, 42 Ohio
St. 299 (1884).
77 See Burgoyne v. Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co., 5 Ohio St. 586, 587
(1855).
78 Big Store Co. v. Levine, 22 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 469 (1920).
79 All partners are not necessary parties but any one or more of the
members of a partnership may be sued for a firm tort. Big Store Co. v.
Levine, 22 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 469 (1920).
80 See Reeve v. Wheeler, 11 Ohio L. Rep. 510 (C.P. 1910).
81 OIo GEN. CODE § 10509-139 (1938): Applied or discussed in Bur-
goyne v. Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co., 5 Ohio St. 586 (1855); Well v. Guerin,
42 Ohio St. 299 (1884); Simon v. Rudner, 43 Ohio App. 38, 182 N.E. 650
(1932).
82 Onto GEN. CODE § 11256 (1938). Bazell v. Belcher, 31 Ohio St. 572
(1877); Ohio Well Supply Co. v. Scott, 11 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 123 (1910).
8 3 Oiro GEN. CODE §§ 11299, 11583 (1938).
84 0nro GEN. CODE § 11644 (1938).
85 See Hawkins v. Lasley, 40 Ohio St. 37, 38 (1883).
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vidually served.8 6 Further, levy will reach the separate property of
any obligor later served and made a party to the judgment."'
In case suit against less than all joint obligors results in judg-
ment, it is the common-law view that the original joint cause of ac-
tion is merged in the judgment and all unserved obligors are thereby
released. 8 This too has been modified in Ohio, in that even after
judgment action may still be brought against parties not served, at
least until the cause of action has been extinguished by satisfaction."
Finally, while the common-law doctrine that a release of one
joint or joint and several obligor releases all 90 still obtains during
the active life of the partnership, the legislature has now provided
that compromise of contract obligations after dissolution constitutes
a discharge only of the party negotiating it, leaving the obligation of
his co-partners still intactY' Tort obligations are not dealt with in
this statute 2
The Uniform Act leaves this background undisturbed. The sub-
stantive nature of joint liability in contract, joint and several in
tort, is reaffirmed.9 3 As under modern Ohio statutes, the estate of a
deceased partner is made liable for partnership debts.9 4 No pro-
vision is made in the Act as to parties, judgment or executions, in
actions on joint obligations." The Act thus affirms certain aspects
of Ohio law and makes no reference to others. If adopted, it would
accomplish no change.
86 OHio GEN. CODE §10418 (1938).
8 7 OHIo GEN. CODE § 11644 (1938).
88 Sloo v. Lea, 18 Ohio 279 (1849); National LaFayette Bank v. Scott,
13 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 600 (1903).
89 Stone v. Whittaker, 61 Ohio St. 194, 55 N.E. 614 (1899); Yoho v.
McGovern, 42 Ohio St. 11 (1884).
9 Westcott v. Price, Wright 220 (Ohio 1833).
9 Omo GEN. CODE § 8079 (1938). This section is limited to compromises
effectual after dissolution. Ohio General Code Section 8084 makes Section
8079 applicable to all joint debtors. Even though partners are joint debtors
the courts have held this section inapplicable to compromises effected before
dissolution. Robinson v. Bergholz, 4 Ohio Dec. Rep. 103 (C.P. 1878); see
Walsh v. Miller, 51 Ohio St. 462, 485 (1894). But see Wheeling Corrugating
Co. v. Veach, 7 Ohio N.P. 156, 157 (1897).9 2Moore v. Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry., 7 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 368 (1908);
Heyndricks v. Faudel, 16 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 26, 37 Ohio C.C. 293 (1908); Gil-
bert v. Timms, 7 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 253, 28 Ohio C.C. 107 (1905). Contra:
Jenkins v. Pachoud & Co., 18 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 321 (1907). Cf. Spencer v.
Spencer, 53 Ohio St. 682 (1895) (no opinion) (tort claim had been reduced
to judgment before compromise effected).
93 THE ACT § 15.
9
- THE ACT § 36 (4).
95 The Commissioners' note to Section 15 (b) of the Act states that the
purpose of the Act is to make uniform the substantive law of partnership,
and therefore where a state such as Ohio has already procedurally declared
the liability to be joint and several, it would not be out of line with the
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NATURE OF PARTNERS=P PROPERTY; PERSONALTY
Partnership assets at common law consist of all the partnership
property, personal or real, tangible or intangible, whether acquired
by way of capital pr advances made to the firm by the members, or
acquired with partnership funds.9 6 The principal test used to de-
termine whether property is partnership property is the intent of
the partners. 7 In the absence of evidence of expressed intent, the
courts will infer an intent from the attending circumstances, such as
the source of the property, the purpose for which it was acquired,
the manner in which it was acquired and the method of dealing
with itY8 In the case of personal property, conveyances can be
taken and conveyed in the firm name, title being viewed neverthe-
less as in the partners themselves. 9 None of the partners has an
exclusive right to such property. All have an equal right to possess
it for purposes of the business of the partnership.1 0 No one partner
can transfer legal title to any specific personal property save for
partnership purposes.' 0 '
The courts have agreed that the co-ownership of personal prop-
erty by partners is neither a tenancy in common nor strictly a joint
tenancy. The right of survivorship exists but only to the extent of
payment of partnership obligations. 02 Perhaps the most apt de-
scription, as some writers have said, is "tenancy in partnership." 10
From all of this it is apparent that each individual partner's interest
in the partnership property is a share in the proceeds of the prop-
erty after the payment of partnership debts. 0 4
The Act makes no changes with respect to partnership assets,
.or the nature of each partner's interest in partnership personal
property. It provides in Section 8 (1) that "all property originally
principle of uniformity to make an appropriate change in Section 15 (b).
The authors feel that such a change is unnecessary. The enactment of
-Section 15 (b) stating that, substantively speaking, partnership contrac-
tual liability is joint would not repeal the Ohio legislation discussed in the
text since that legislation is merely procedural.
96 MEcHEm, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 138 (2d ed. 1920).
97 See Rammelsberg v. Mitchell, 29 Ohio St. 22, 47 (1875).
08 MEcHEm, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP §§ 139-141 (2d ed.
1920).
09 Id. at §§ 150-152.
100 Nixon v. Nash, 12 Ohio St. 647 (1861).
l-0 See Page v. Thomas, 43 Ohio St. 38, 43, 1 N.E. 79, 82 (1885).
102 MEcHzM, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PATNERSHIP § 143 (2d ed. 1920).
10 3 Id. at § 144.
104 Ludlow v. Cooper, 4 Ohio St. 1 (1854); Place v. Sweetzer, 16 Ohio
142 (1847); Fisher v. Lang, 10 Ohio Dec. Rep. 178 (Sup. Ct. 1887); see Page
v. Thomas, 43 Ohio St. 38, 43, 1 N.E. 79, 82 (1885); Rodgers v. Meranda, 7
Ohio St. 179, 181, 182 (1857); Homer v. Meyers, 29 Ohio L. Bull. 403 (Super.
,Ct. 1898).
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brought into the partnership stock or subsequently acquired by pur-
chase or otherwise, on account of the partnership,_is partnership
property," and in Section 8 (2) that "unless the contrary intention
appears, property acquired with partnership funds is partnership
property." Under this language, as at common law, the criterion
whether a particular item of property is partnership property is
intent of the partners."1 5 Section 25 provides that each partner, sub-
ject to the provisions of the Act and to any agreement between the
partners, has an equal right with his partners to possess specific
partnership property for partnership purposes, but no right inde-
pendent thereof; that the separate right of each partner is not
assignable by the separate partner; that it is not subject to attach-
ment or execution of his separate creditors; and that on the death
of a partner his right vests in the surviving partner (or partners)
but that such survivor has no right to possess the partnership prop-
erty for any but partnership purposes. Section 26 provides that "a
partner's interest in the partnership is his share of the profits and
surplus, and the same is personal property." The Act describes the
interests of each partner in specific partnership property as a "ten-
ancy in partnership." 106 This is clear recognition of an ownership
but of a type distinct from either tenancy in common or joint
tenancy.
Each partner has a right to receive the balance of firm assets
in cash after firm debts are paid.10 7 The partners are therefore not
entitled to partition of property remaining in kind after firm credit-
ors have been paid.10 8
Tm REAL PROPERTY PROBLEM
It is a long-standing principle that legal title to real property
must vest in a legal person.10" A partnership not being a legal per-
son at common law can not therefore receive 1" or convey 'I real
105 State Bank v. Bagley Bros., 44 Wyo. 244, 11 P. 2d 572 (1932), re-
hearing denied, 44 Wyo. 456, 13 P. 2d 564 (1932); Block v. Schmidt, 296 Mich.
310, 296 N.W. 698 (1941); Quinn v. Leidinger, 107 N.J. Eq. 188, 152 Atl. 249
(Ch. 1930), aff'd, 110 N.J. Eq. 663, 160 Atl. 537 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932).
106 THE ACT § 25.
10 7 THE ACT § 38.
10 8 See Dow v. Beals, 149 Misc. 631, 632, 268 N.Y. Supp. 425, 427 (Sup.
Ct. 1933); Higgins v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 312 Ill. 11, 25, 143 N.E. 482,
487 (1924); Swarthout v. Gentry, 62 Calif. App. 2d 68, 144 P. 2d 38 (1944),
wherein the court without reference to the Act stated it would permit a
distribution in kind if all partnership debts were paid and the partition
would not be to the detriment of either partner.
109 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 443 (3d ed. 1939).
11 ORammelsberg v. Mitchell, 29 Ohio St. 22 (1875); Bank v. Johnson,
47 Ohio St. 306, 24 N.E. 503 (1889); Teare v. Cain, 7 Ohio C.C. 375 (1893).
"' Stambaugh v. Smith, 23 Ohio St. 584 (1873).
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property in its firm name. If on the other hand legal title is taken
in the individual names of several or all the partners, they hold the
title, as tenants in common,"12 and the legal interest of each will
pass to his heirs. 1 ' In addition, if a deceased partner leaves a sur-
viving spouse, the latter is entitled to common law curtesy or dower,
or today statutory dower in legal estate.114 These principles are all
too logical products of a combination of the aggregate theory of
partnership and the real property concept of legal title, but they
have given rise to a variety of questions as to locus of title and have
rendered the settlement of partnership affairs upon dissolution ex-
ceedingly difficult. However, as partnership use of, and dealings in,
real estate have become more frequent, courts of equity have
evolved a set of quite different criteria for the determination of
equitable interests." 5 These are, in a sense, superimposed on the
framework of legal interests. But to accomplish this readjustment,
the equity court must first determine whether the property is what
it terms "partnership real estate."
Fundamentally this is said to be a matter of intent,"16 but, as
has been seen, in the absence of express statements, certain indicia
of this intent are seized upon as adequate to establish it. Although
separate ownership of the property prior to formation of the part-
nership is presumed to continue,11 7 land that is later acquired and
paid for with firm funds is viewed as partnership real estate."",
Equity treats this property as having the incidents of personalty
and describes it as "converted." "19
At this point Ohio courts have introduced marked confusion by
the assertion that this conversion may be of two sorts. Thus, land
bought with firm funds but not actually needed for firm purposes
or used in the firm business, is described as converted in equity sub
modo; 10 while property not only bought with firm funds but both
needed and used in the firm business is regarded as converted out
and out.112 While the courts of equity have viewed this property
112 Greene v. Graham, 5 Ohio 264 (1831). See Miller v. Proctor, 20
Ohio St. 442, 445 (1870).
113 Rammelsberg v. Mitchell, 29 Ohio St. 22 (1875); Greene v. Graham,
supra note 112.
114 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 504 (3d ed. 1939). Cf. Greene v. Greene,
1 Ohio 535 (1824); Sumner v. Hampson, 8 Ohio 328 (1838).
L15 See Sumner v. Hampson, supra note 114, at 365.
"'
6 Rammelsburg v. Mitchell, 29 Ohio St. 22 (1875).
117 Jones v. De Camp, 2 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 133 (1903), aff'd without
opinion, 72 Ohio St. 616, 76 N.E. 1123 (1905).
118 Rammelsberg v. Mitchell, 29 Ohio St. 22 (1875).
1192 TIFFAN?, REAL PROPERTY § 447 (3d ed. 1939).
1 0 Rammelsberg v. Mitchell, 29 Ohio St. 22 (1875).
12'Rammelsberg v. Mitchell, supra note 120. The courts of most
American jurisdictions do not make a distinction between conversion sub
modo or pro tanto, and conversion out and out. They ordinarily regard all
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as having the incidents of personalty in both instances for the dura-
tion of the conversion, they have considered the period during which
this conversion is effective as of different durations in the two cases.
Thus, when the property is no longer needed to satisfy the claims of
firm creditors in the case of sub modo conversion, its character as
personalty ceases; 122 whereas in the case of out-and-out conversion
this characteristic endures even after firm debts are paid.123 In
either event, during the period that the real estate still retains its
character of personalty in equity, the equitable ownership is dis-
tributed as personalty on death, and is free from dower.12
It is in relation to this confusing problem of partnership real
estate that the Act makes one of its major contributions. This is
accomplished by the sum total effect of provisions defining partner-
ship property, the mode of its conveyance and the nature of each
partner's interest in firm real estate.
Section 8 (3) of the Act provides that "any estate in real prop-
erty may be acquired in the partnership name. Title so acquired
can be conveyed only in the partnership name." 125 This section is
permissive rather than mandatory with respect to acquisition of
real property by the partnership. It avoids, however, the necessity
of taking title to partnership property in the names of the several
partners 126 and in consequence also avoids the problems which
have arisen under the common law as to the location of legal title
when real property was conveyed to the partnership in its firm
name. To the extent utilized, it should avoid any question as to
whether the property is firm property. Certainly where real prop-
erty is taken in the firm name, it will be considered partnership
property in the absence of compelling proof to the contrary.12 1
The fact that property is not taken in the firm name, however,
does not indicate that the real estate is not partnership property.
Section 10 (3) states that title to real estate may also be taken in
partnership real estate as being converted sub modo only. 2 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 447 (3d ed. 1939). MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNER-
sHip § 163 (2d ed. 1920).
122Rammelsberg v. Mitchell, supra note 120.
123 Rammelsberg v. Mitchell, supra note 120; Ludlow v. Cooper, 4 Ohio
St. 1 (1854); Fisher v. Lang, 10 Ohio Dec. Rep. 178 (Super. Ct. 1887).
"24Rammelsberg v. Mitchell, supra note 120; Greene v. Greene, 1 Ohio
535 (1824); Sumner v. Hampson, 8 Ohio 328 (1838).
1_25 Section 8 (4) of the Act provides that the entire estate of the
grantor passes when a conveyance of real property is made to a partner-
ship in the partnership name. This section is probably unnecessary. Ohio
General Code Section 8510-1 provides that no words of inheritance are
needed to pass a fee simple estate.
126 See Scheurman v. Farbman, 245 Mich. 688, 224 N.W. 604 (1929);
Windom Nat. Bank v. Klein, 191 Minn. 447, 254 N.W. 602 (1934).
117 See Windom Nat. Bank v. Klein, supra note 126.
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the name of one or more of the partners.1 28 Moreover, the defini-
tion of partnership property does not, of course, require the taking
of title in the firm name. As a matter of fact, this definition as con-
tained in Sections 8 (1) and (2) appears broader than at common
law. Under the Act partnership property includes not only "prop-
erty brought into the partnership stock originally" but also "prop-
erty acquired by purchase or otherwise, on account of the partner-
ship", a phrase more comprehensive than the usual common-law
requirement of purchase with partnership funds.
Save for the sections dealing with conveyances,120 the Act makes
no distinction between real and personal property. As has already
been noted, it provides that each partner has only a "tenancy in
partnership" in specific partnership property, whether personal or
real.' The nature of this tenancy is such that the partner has only
an equal right with his partners to possess the specific partnership
property, his right is not assignable, is not subject to attachment or
execution, and on his death it vests in the surviving partner and is
not subject to dower.13'
The Act also provides that a partner's interest in the partner-
ship is his share of the profits and surplus,1 32 and'this, of course, is in
the nature of personal property. Upon dissolution, each partner may
have the partnership property applied to discharge its liabilities,
and the surplus applied in cash to pay the net amount owing to each
partner. 33 Thus, to use the judicial terminology, the Act effects a
conversion of real property at law comparable to that now restricted
to courts of equity. Expressed differently, for partnership purposes,
all real property of the partnership whether necessary to, and used
in, the partnership or not, is considered personalty,--the conversion
is therefore out-and-out. The conversion is no longer restricted to
proceedings in equity. By virtue of the Act, it is equally effective at
law.
3 4
128 Some illustrative cases under the Act holding property taken in
individual names of partners to be partnership property are: Bratton v.
Morris, 54 Idaho 743, 37 P. 2d 1097 (1934); Shanahan v. Olmsted County
Bank & Trust Co., 217 Minn. 454, 14 N.W. 2d 433 (1944); Matter of Allen,
148 Misc. 488, 266 N.Y. Supp. 277 (Super. Ct. 1933).
1
2
9 THE AcT § 10.
130 THE AcT §25.
'3' THE ACT § 25.
132T AcT § 26.
133 THE ACT § 38.
"3 a. Wharf v. Wharf, 306 Ill. 79, 137 N.E. 446 (1922); Altman v. Alt-
man, 271 App. Div. 884, 67 N.Y.S. 2d 119 (1946); In re Dumarest's
Estate, 146 Misc. 442, 262 N.Y. Supp. 450 (Surr. Ct. 1933). See Smith v. Guy,
23 Tenn. App. 352, 144 S.W. 2d 702 (1940); cert. denied by Tenn. Sup. Ct.
Oct. 5, 1940.
b. If the Act is to be enacted in Ohio a slight change should be made
in Section 25 (2) (e). That section states that "A partner's right in specific
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While dealing with real property, it is perhaps appropriate to,
discuss one problem of conveyancing under the Act that has caused
concern to some commentators. 35 As previously mentioned, the Act
provides that real property acquired by the partnership in the firm
name may be conveyed in the firm name.136 Any partner acting
within the scope of his authority as a partner may convey the title
to the property by a conveyance thus executed.13 7 If the conveyance
is not within the scope of the conveying partner's authority, the
partnership may recover the real estate so conveyed unless it has in
the meantime been conveyed by the grantee to a holder for value,
without the knowledge that the partner in making the conveyance
has exceeded his authority.13 Two queries arise. How will the title
examiner know that the partner who executed the conveyance was
in fact a partner or had authority to convey? Further, won't the
holder for value from the partnership grantor be placed upon in-
quiry as to the authority of the executing partner, since a check
of the vendor's title will disclose a partnership in the chain of title?
Mr. Lewis, the draftsman of the Act, has given his answer to both
queries. As to the first, he suggests that the acknowledgment by the
executing partner will undoubtedly state that he is a partner and.
that he is authorized to convey the property."9 This he points out
is all that appears as to the authority of a corporation to convey real
estate. If the grantee wishes to relieve all uncertainty, he may get
a certified statement from the other partner, just as a person taking
title from a corporation may make certain by obtaining a certified
copy of a resolution of the board of directors authorizing the con-
veyance and of the appointment of the officers executing the con-
partnership property is not subject to dower, curtesy, or allowances to
widows, heirs or next of kin." "Curtesy" has been abolished in Ohio.
OHio GEN. CODE § 10502-8 (1938). Dower, unless the property has been
conveyed during coverture without joinder, expires at death. Omo GEN.
CODE § 10502-1 (1938). At the death of the spouse owning the legal estate,
the surviving spouse is entitled to a statutory inheritance in lieu of dower
and this may be elected even against the will. OHIO GEN. CODE §§ 10502-1,
10503-4, 10504-55, 10504-61 (1938). Accordingly, for adoption in Ohio Sec-
tion 25 (2) (e) should be amended to read "A partner's right in specific
partnership property is not subject to dower, statutory interest of a surviv-
ing spouse, of heirs or of next of kin, or allowances to a surviving spouse
or minor children."
13-' Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act, A Criticism, 28 HARV. L. REv.
762, 779 (1915); Day, Uniform Partnership Act with Oregon Notes, 22 ORE.
L. REV. 207 (1943). But see Williams, The Uniform Partnership Act Comes
to Nebraska, 22 NEB. L. REV. 215, 221 (1943).
136 THE ACT §8 (3).
13 7 THE ACT §10 (1).
I3s THEACT § 10 (1).
139 Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. Crane's
Criticism, 29 HARV. L. REV. 291, 298 (1916).
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veyance as an officer. As to the second query, the Act by clear
implication provides that mere knowledge that a partnership once
owned the property is not enough to put a remote grantee on notice
concerning the executing partner's authority.14 0 This is the whole
import of the language ". . . or unless such property has been con-
veyed by the grantee or a person claiming through such grantee
to a holder for value without knowledge that the partner, in making
the conveyance, has exceeded his authority." '1 The knowledge in
question clearly relates to the excess of authority, not merely to
the existence of a partnership. The use of the word "knowledge"
instead of the word "notice" fortifies this conclusion in view of the
definition of these two terms as contained in the Act.4 2
RIGHT OF SEPARATE CREDITOR OF AN INDIVIDUAL PARTNER TO ATTAcH
PARTNERSHrp INTERESTS-THE CHARGING ORDER
The familiar principle that a creditor may reach his debtor's
assets and apply them to the satisfaction of his debt, has a special
significance when the debtor is a partner and among his assets is
his interest in the partnership. As has been seen, this interest is a
right to a distributive share in such residue of partnership assets as
may not be needed for the payment of firm obligations; during the
active continuance of the partnership this is viewed in the case of
personalty, as a nonexclusive co-tenancy with the right of survivor-
ship; in the case of real estate, as a legal estate consistent with the
language of the deed, subject to an equitable estate as formulated
by the doctrine of conversion as previously stated. 43
The ordinary processes of a law court are hardly suited to the
appropriation of this sort of an interest to the claims of a creditor.
Levy of an attachment or execution involves the taking of posses-
sion, and to take possession of an intangible right to an undeter-
mined distributive share poses a problem of no mean difficulty to the
practical-minded arm of the law.
This problem has already been encountered in Ohio with the
result that it has been held, for lack of better solution, that the
separate creditor of a partner may secure a levy upon partnership
assets with a view to the sale of so much of the debtor's residuary
share therein as may be needed to satisfy the debt.1 4 The purchaser
140 Day, Uniform Partnership Act with Oregon Notes, 22 ORE. L. REV.
207, 210 (1943). In footnote 12 on page 210, Mr. Day set forth an excerpt
of a letter received from Mr. Lewis commenting on this problem.
'41"THE ACT § 10 (1).
142 THE ACT § 3. -
143 See text pp. 631-635 supra.
144 Nixon v. Nash, 12 Ohio St. 647 (1861); Sutcliffe v. Dohrman, 18
Ohio 181 (1849); Place v. Sweetzer, 16 Ohio 142 (1847).
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becomes a tenant in common with the partners to the extent of his
interest but with no right to use the property nor himself to become
a partner.4 5 In the interim, the officer's possession has interrupted
the firm business and the nature of the interest offered for sale is
too uncertain to bring an adequate price.146
This wholly impracticable situation has been partially relieved
by assistance from the equity side by means of an injunction of the
sale pending the determination of the nature and value of the
debtor-partner's interest through an accounting."' This is obtain-
able at the behest of any of the partners, including the debtor, or of
the creditor himself.18 At best this procedure is unwieldy for the
creditor and disturbing to firm business. At worst, it is readily
susceptible to abuse in forcing solvent partners to pay the debts of
an insolvent co-partner as the price of avoiding disruption of the
business.
A separate creditor's effort to reach his debtor-partner's interest
in partnership real estate is rendered slightly less complex by the
fact that legal title may in fact be in the debtor and thus subject
initially to the acquisition of a legal lien. But here again he is faced
by the principle that such title is held in trust for the payment of
firm debts, and since it is but a right to a distributive share after
firm debts are paid, his lien in the last analysis is subordinate to
the claims, and even the after-acquired liens, of firm creditors.'4 9
The Act would drastically revise the procedure available to a
separate creditor in satisfying his claim against a debtor partner
out of his debtor's interest in the partnership. It has already been
noted that the Act creates a tenancy in partnership with incidents
comparable to those which courts of equity have superimposed on
legal estates; it makes these incidents legal incidents.5 0 In fact, it
expressly provides that a partner's right in specific partnership
property is not subject to attachment or execution at the instigation
of a separate creditor of an individual partner. 15' The only creditors
who can reach partnership property in these ways are firm creditors,
-those having claims arising from a contract within the scope of
the partnership. 52 Thus under the Act the separate creditor can no
longer disrupt the partnership business.
45 Nixon v. Nash, supra note 144.
146 Nixon v. Nash, supra note 144.
14 Place v. Sweetzer, 16 Ohio 142 (1847).
348 Nixon v. Nash, 12 Ohio St. 647 (1861); Place v. Sweetzer, 16 Ohio
142 (1847).
14 Page v. Thomas, 43 Ohio St. 38, 1 N.E. 79 (1885).
150 THE ACT § 25.
15 THE ACT §25 (2) (C).
152 THE ACT §25 (2) (C).
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However, the Act provides the separate creditor, in case he has
reduced his claim to judgment, with an alternative procedure com-
monly known as the "charging order." He may apply to any com-
petent court, including the court which gave him his judgment, and
the court is empowered in its discretion to charge the interest of
the debtor-partner in the partnership with payment of the unsatis-
fied amount of judgment debt with interest. 53 Further the court
is given authority to appoint a receiver of the debtor-partner's share
of the profits or any other money due the debtor-partner from the
partnership "and make all other orders, directions, accounts and in-
quiries which the debtor-partner might have made, or which the
circumstances of the case may require." 154
This procedure at once .avoids interference with the existing
partnership and provides a practical method by which the separate
creditor may collect his debt from the individual partner. This is
undoubtedly a highly significant contribution of the Act.
The provisions for a charging order unfortunately appear to
leave two rather important questions unanswered. May the separate
creditor cause the individual partner's interest to be sold or must
he content himself with collecting the profits and other moneys due
his debtor from the partnership as the partnership makes distribu-
tion? Second, does a sale, if one is permitted,to a person other than
a partner have the effect of dissolving the partnership? If the
answer to the first question is that the individual partner's interest
may not be sold under any circumstances, the remaining partners
have the power to postpone a separate creditor by refusing to make
a distribution until ordered to do so by the court. If a sale to a
stranger may be permitted and the effect is to dissolve the partner-
ship, much of the value of this section would be lost.
Ry clear inference the language empowers the court to direct a
sale, since the express authority to co-partners to purchase would
otherwise be meaningless. That the Act also authorizes the appoint-
ment of a receiver is no necessary contradiction, for it may well be
left to the court's discretion to determine which course is the wiser.
The last phrase, granting power to issue any orders "which the cir-
cumstances of the case may require" would seem clear confirmation
of this broad confidence.155
15s THE ACT §28.
15' THE ACT §28.
155 There seem to be but few cases concerning the charging order and
of these only two, one an English case and one a lower court case in Penn-
sylvania, throw any light on the problem under discussion. In Brown,
Janson.& Co. v. A. Hutchinson & Co., 1 Q.B.D. 737 (1895), the Court of Ap-
peals indicates that the only effect of a charging order and appointment of
a receiver in the absence of a further order of the court is to enjoin the
remaining partners from paying any of the proceeds of the partnership to
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The language of Section 28 (2) of the Act expressly states that
there shall be no dissolution where a partner purchases from his
separate property or one or more partners do so from firm property
"with the consent of all the partners whose interests are not so
charged or sold." It will be noted that no reference is made to a
purchase by a stranger or to whether a sale to him will dissolve the
firm.156 No answer then, will be found here, but this is not the only
section to consider.
Perhaps the clearest reference is in Section 32 (2) providing
that on application of a purchaser of a partner's interest under Sec-
tion 27 or 28 (the latter being the section in question) the court may
with certain qualifications, dissolve the partnership, a power ob-
viously unnecessary if dissolution had already been accomplished
by the sale. Moreover, Section 27 states that a voluntary conveyance
of a partner's interest does not dissolve, and the enumeration in
Section 31 of acts and events that will cause dissolution does not
include a conveyance, either voluntary or involuntary. The sum
total of these provisions is persuasive, therefore, that the debtor
partner's interest may be purchased by any person without thereby
causing a dissolution and that the partners themselves may pur-
chase in either of the two ways indicated by paragraphs (a) and
(b), of Section 28 (2). This interpretation relieves the court of the
responsibility of bringing about a dissolution by the order of sale,
although it is true that if the partnership be at will, as many are,
the purchaser may return to apply for a dissolution subsequently as
a matter of right under Section 32 (2). The situation in this one
contingency would then be reminiscent of the present common-law
predicament where a separate creditor, as already noted, can
seriously disrupt the partnership business.1 7
There are two further matters of some importance in connection
with the charging order. First it is not necessary to issue a writ
the debtor-partner. In Frankil v. Frankil, 15 Pa. D. & C. 103 (1931), the
court in connection with a charging order directed the sheriff to sell the
debtor-partner's interest in the firm. See Note, 10 Wis. L. REv. 120 (1934).
If full effect is to be given to the apparent purpose of Section 28, the courts
should not order a sale save under exceptional circumstances such as where
it appears the remaining partners deliberately withheld the declaration of
profits to hinder the debtor-partner's creditor. Otherwise the remaining
partners might find themselves in a position similar to that in which the
common law placed them.
156 Under the terms of Section 31 (1) (c) it would seem that if a
charging order is issued against the interest in the partnership of one part-
ner, the remaining partners may then dissolve the firm.
1,57 This further fortifies the conclusion that a sale of the debtor-part-
ner's interest in the partnership should only be ordered in connection with
a charging order where it appears that the sale will not disrupt the business
of the remaining partners or where the collection of the separate creditor's
judgment would be indefinitely postponed.
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of execution before applying for a charging order.158 Also, the
debtor-partner is entitled to whatever personal exemption he has
under local law.159 This is in contrast with levy of an attachment of
or execution upon specific partnership property by a firm creditor,
in which case under the Act none of the partners may claim any
right under the homestead or exemption laws.160 The same distinc-
tion exists at common law.161
CHANGE IN PARTNERSHIP PERSONNEL
At common law the partnership relation has always been pecu-
liarly unstable. In fact, the risk of easy, uncontemplated dissolution
has been second only to the risk of joint liability on partnership
obligations. Thus, any addition or subtraction in the number of
members of a general partnership, whether inter vivos or by death,
has uniformly been viewed as accomplishing instant dissolution,
quite regardless of any evidence of intent to the contrary.162
The explanation for this has ordinarily been two-fold: first,
that since the relationship is fiduciary it depends intimately on the
personal choice of colleagues, that no partner can be deemed to have
consented to relationships in any respect different from those he
initially undertook, for to force upon him either more or fewer co-
partners with the consequent inevitable diversity of qualification
and personality, is to expose him to risks never contemplated; and,
second, that from the standpoint of legal concepts, and in the
absence of a legal entity, a contract relation between one set of joint
obligors is inevitably a contract different from that between another
such set; that in the very nature of things this is true regardless of
whether, in fact, consent has been given so clearly as to obviate the
first explanation in terms of choice of one's associates. 63
In consequence, the retirement of a partner, assuming it to be
effectuated as to creditors by adequate notice, terminates all author-
15' Scott v. Platt, 177 Ore. 515, 163 P. 2d 293 (1945); r~ehearing denied,
177 Ore. 515, 164 P. 2d 255. See Rader v. Goldoff, 223 App. Div. 455, 228
N.Y. Supp. 453 (1928); Sherwood v. Jackson, 121 Cal. App. 354, 8 P. 2d
943 (1932). If execution is issued it may create rights even though no
seizure of specific partnership property may be made pursuant thereto.
First National Bank of Charleston v. White, 268 Ill. App. 414 (1932).
'9 THE ACT § 28 (3).
16o THE ACT § 25 (2) (c).
161 Gaylord v. Imhoff, 26 Ohio St. 317 (1875); Aultman, Miller & Co. v.
Wilson, 55 Ohio St. 138, 44 N. E. 1092 (1896). But cf. Mortley v. Flanagan, 38
Ohio St. 401 (1882).
162 Snyder Mfg. Co. v. Snyder, 54 Ohio St. 86, 43 N.E. 325 (1896).
163 MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 57 (2d ed. 1920)_
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ity of remaining partners to bind him,'" although, of course, it does
not relieve him from joint obligations incurred prior to retirement.'
Conversely, advent of a new incoming member creates an authority
to impose joint liability as of the time of admission but, in the
absence of consent, exposes him to none of the firm obligations in-
curred prior thereto.16 In theory, in both instances the old firm is
liquidated. In practice, however, the same business is frequently
continued without interruption. Where this happens, creditors of
the old firm sometimes try to reach the assets of the new firm in
order to satisfy their claims. While it is clear at common law that
they cannot reach new assets which the new firm has subsequently
acquired, the cases are not clear as to the ability of the old firm
creditors to reach such assets of the old firm as may be retained by
the new one. 16 7 This is undoubtedly attributable to the fact that in
many instances determination of the question has turned on one of
two other factors: either the remaining partner or the new partner
has assumed the debts of the old firm (or the courts have inferred
that they have);16s or the courts have found that a transfer from
164 Palmer v. Dodge, 4 Ohio St. 21 (1854); Gardner v. Conn, 34 Ohio
St. 187 (1877); Feigley v. Whitaker, 22 Ohio St. 606 (1872).
165 Reed v. Ramey, 82 Ohio App. 171 (1948). See Horsey v. Heath, 5
Ohio 353, 356, 357 (1832).
166 See Andres v. Morgan, 62 Ohio St. 236, 56 N.E. 875 (1900).
267 It can be contended that since by definition a partner's interest in
firm property is essentially residuary-merely a right to what is left after
payment of firm creditors therefrom-the incoming partner can acquire
only this residuary right and as a consequence has no claim to such assets
of the old firm as may be acquired by the new one until after the creditors
of the old firm have been paid therefrom. Menagh v. Whitwell, 52 N.Y. 146
(1873). However, even in that case it seems admitted that creditors of the
new firm have priority over creditors of the old firm in all the assets of the
new firm including those acquired from the old firm. Id. at 169. In addition
the opinion in Wehrman v. McFarlan, 6 Ohio N.P. 333, 335 (1899) contains
the phrase, "as in an ordinary firm where the incoming of a new partner
constitutes a new partnership, and the assets alone, and not the partner
personally, are liable for old debts. . . ." On the other hand the theory can
be advanced that a transfer to a retiring partner or to a third person of a
partner's interest destroys the partner's lien since he transfers all his inter-
est in the property. Bankley v. Tapp, 87 Ind. 25 (1882). Mr. Mechem says
"The whole subject is now very much in confusion and uncertainty. .. ."
MEcHEm, THE ErMErrs OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHI § 462 (2d ed. 1920).
Mr. Lewis, without citing cases, states that the old firm creditors take after
the new firm creditors in all the assets of the new firm. Lewis, The Uniform
Partnership Act, 24 YALE L. J. 616, 634 (1915).
168 Smead v. Lacey, 12 Ohio Dec. Rep. 597 (Super. Ct. 1896) is an ex-
cellent example of the technique used by the courts to find an assumption
of old firm debts by the incoming partner and thus protect creditors of the
old firm in the assets of the new firm.
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one or all the partners to third persons or the remaining partner is
in fraud of creditors.1 69
In terms of legal theory under the Act dissolution is not caused
merely by the conveyance by a partner of his interest; 170 it is
equally true that the Act permits subsequent voluntary dissolution
by the remaining partners 1 ' and recognizes dissolution by the
withdrawal of a partner.'7 2 These provisions would seem to indicate
that contrary to common-law theory, the addition of a further part-
ner unaccompanied by any withdrawal does not dissolve.1 7 3 Not
only is this contrary to the present attitude in Ohio as to dissolution,
but other sections of the Act stipulate that a newly admitted part-
ner is liable for prior firm debts, with the limitation, however, that
this liability can be satisfied only from partnership property.'7 ' Since
the Act fails to limit this latter principle to assets acquired from the
old firm, it is apparent that the Act does away with the uncertainty
that exists at common law concerning the ability of old firm credi-
tors to reach old firm assets in the possession of the new firm. Fur-
ther this provision permits the old firm creditors to reach any new
assets which the new firm acquires. Thus under the Act, both old
and new firm creditors share equally in all assets of the new firm.
The important modification entailed by this language relates to
the capacity of prior firm creditors to reach assets of the new firm
established subsequent to the change in personnel. The Act thus
changes the common law and permits prior firm creditors to retain
their status as such in respect to firm assets subsequent to admission
of the new partner. Not only is this consequence expressly spelled
out in a later section of the Act, but it is extended to a substantial
variety of cases where, by the Act, dissolution has in fact occurred
but "the business is continued without liquidation of the partner-
ship affairs". 75
169 See Andres v. Morgan, 62 Ohio St. 236, 56 N.E. 875 (1900) (court
not only found an assumption of debts but found that the transfer of all
the assets of a partnership to a corporation organized by all the partners
tended to operate as a fraud on creditors).
170 THE ACT § 27.
7 1 
THE ACT §31 (1) (C).
172 THE ACT § 29.
173 Lichtenberger, The Uniform Partnership Act, 63 U. OF PA. L. REV.
639, 644, (1915). But see Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YALE L. J.
617, 635 (1915).
171-THE ACT §§ 17, 41 (1).
175 THE Acr § 41. In brief, under the Act, as long as one of the old firm
remains as a member of the new firm or as sole proprietor of the old firm's
business, creditors of the old firm continue to be creditors of the new firm
or sole proprietor. If all the members of the old firm sell to third parties,
creditors of the old firm are not creditors of the third parties unless the
third parties promise to pay the debts of the old firm. Whether a partner-
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It may thus be said that the Act affirmatively protects persons
whose claims against the partnership arose prior to the change in
personnel, and permits them to continue their status as firm creditors
as to the property of the new firm after this change, whether or not
the change has been such as to constitute a dissolution under the
Act.
Discussion to this point has assumed that the partners have
entered into no agreement, express or implied, as to these prior
claims. The present law of Ohio recognizes certain contrasting con-
sequences dependent upon such agreements.
Thus, where an incoming partner expressly or by implication
assumes prior firm debts, or where remaining partners assure a
withdrawing partner of such an assumption, or where a retiring
partner makes such an assumption, Ohio has analogized the con-
sequent relation between these persons to a suretyship contract.
The assuming obligor, whether or not already obligated to the firm
creditor, is likened to a principal, and the obligee to a surety with
a right to reimbursement in the event of being forced by the cred-
itor to pay the debt of his former firm.176 Ohio courts have viewed
this relationship as set up by implication exclusively between the
parties, and only operative as to the old firm creditor in case he has
been informed of it and has consented to the modification conse-
quent upon his acceptance of a combination of primary and second-
ary obligors in lieu of the prior combination of joint primary
obligors.177
The Act has codified these principles to the extent of recogniz-
ing that dissolution does not discharge individual liability of any
partner, except as agreed to expressly or impliedly both by his co-
partners and the firm creditor as well,1 7 8 but it varies from the
present Ohio view in that it in effect forces upon a firm creditor a
suretyship relation of which he has notice but to which he need not
have assented. Thus, where one person has agreed to assume firm
obligations, the partner whose obligations have been thus assumed
is discharged (as a surety would be) from liability to any creditor
of the partnership who, knowing of the agreement, consents to a
ship is "continued without liquidation" is a question of fact. Wright,
California Partnership Law and the Uniform Partnership Act, 9 CALIF. L.
R v. 391, 410 (1921).
17 6 Rawson v. Taylor, 30 Ohio St. 389 (1876); Wilson v. Stilwell, 14
Ohio St. 464 (1863); Butler v. Birkey, 13 Ohio St. 514 (1862); Still v. Hol-
land, 1 Ohio Dec. Rep. 584 (C. P. 1853).
177 Rawson v. Taylor, supra note 176.
178TH ACT §36(1) and (2). The individual property of a deceased
partner, while liable for all obligations of the partnership incurred while the
deceased was a member of the firm, is subject to the prior payment of the
deceased's separate debts. THE ACT § 36 (4).
[Vol. 9
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
material alteration in the nature or time of payment of such obliga-
tions.'7  While this protects the creditor's rights against all his
obligors, it forces him on notice to deal with them as though they
were principal and surety at the risk of losing all rights against the
one who is now in the position of surety. 80
It will be noted that the Act does not specify what shall consti-
tute evidence of assumption. Doubtless the holdings of present Ohio
cases remain unchanged. By them it has been stated that in a trans-
fer of an interest by a withdrawing partner to a co-partner there is
a presumption that the latter assumes firm debts; 181 but that in a
transfer to a stranger there is no comparable presumption.8 2 In
either instance evidence of actual intent is relevant.
It has already been seen that under the Act the conveyance by
a partner of his interest does not in itself constitute a dissolution,
although at common law this is held otherwise.1' The Ohio cases
hold that a transferee does not become, nor has he a right to become,
a partner with the remaining partners. 8 4 His sole right is to an
accounting, inspection of the books and sufficient information to
assure his protection. To acquire the further right to membership
in the firm he must have the consent of all remaining co-partners.
Otherwise they are free upon dissolution to form a new firm with
or without him as a member.
The Act affirms this position of the transferee as having no
right beyond that to his assignor's share in the profits. The Act goes
further, however, than the present Ohio decisions in that it specifi-
cally precludes the transferee from participation in management,
from all right to information, or from inspection of books or account-
ing. Upon dissolution, however, the transferee has a limited right
to such an accounting.' 8' In the event of lapse of the time specified
for its continuance, or at any time in case the partnership is one at
will, the Act grants the transferee the right to a dissolution by
judicial decree. 88 Both provisions, it may be noted, preclude the
179 THE ACT §36 (3).
18 0 Lenger v. Hulst, 259 Mich. 640, 244 N.W. 187 (1932).
281 Pendleton v. Foley, 21 Ohio App. 118, 152 N.E. 778 (1925). Since
the Act by Section 41 permits old firm creditors to share equally with new
firm creditors and since, by Section 36(c), upon assumption of debts a re-
tiring partner must be treated as a surety where the creditor knows of the
assumption of debts, the reason for the common-law presumption may no
longer exist under the Act.
18 2 See Andres v. Morgan, 62 Ohio St. 236, 244, 56 N.E. 875, 877 (1900).
183 See Meridian Nat. Bank v. McConica, 8 Ohio C.C. 442, 456 (1894).
184 See Nixon v. Nash, 12 Ohio St. 647 (1861) (indicates rights of a
purchaser at a sale upon execution on a separate partner's interest in the
firm.)
185 THE ACT § 27.
186 THE ACT § 32(2).
1948]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
transferee from interfering in any way with the administration of
the firm during any term in effect at the time of the transfer.
It is thus apparent that adoption of the Act in Ohio would
modify appreciably the relations and rights of the partners and
creditors consequent upon transfer of a partner's interest. This
modification relates to the question whether the addition of an in-
coming partner constitutes a dissolution; it relates to the position
of a firm creditor who has learned of but not assented to an assump-
tion agreement, and to the position of the transferee of a partner's
interest. But the most significant modification is in the clear-cut
recognition that change in personnel with continuation of business
without liquidation, whether or not this may have effected a disso-
lution, does not disturb the rights of prior firm creditors to approach
the assets of the continuing enterprise on a parity with those firm
creditors whose claims have arisen since the change in personnel.
This contribution is stabilizing in its protection of the rights of
firm creditors, and is realistic in its recognition of the practical ac-
ceptance of a continuing enterprise as an economic unit regardless
of the fact that in legal theory there has been both a disintegration
and a reestablishment.
DisTRiBUTiON OF PARTNERSHIp ASSETS
The fact that a debtor is a partner does not in itself change the
nature of the creditor's substantive rights either at law or in equity.
What it does change, as has been seen, is the nature of the assets
accessible to him. This is as true in the case of a partnership creditor
as in that of a separate creditor.
A creditor of the firm-one whose obligation has been-incurred
within the partnership scope-has available both at common law
and equity the joint, and in occasional instances previously dis-
cussed, the joint and several, obligations of all the partners.'87 This
aspect of jointness gives him access to the individual assets of each
separate partner as well as to those that are describable as partner-
ship assets. In contrast the separate creditor of one partner can
reach only the assets of his individual debtor-partner. As a conse-
quence it is possible in a proceeding at law for a firm judgment
creditor to levy on the separate assets of any partner at will and by
reaching them first to subordinate the separate creditor.'8 8 On the
other hand, should a separate creditor pursue his debtor's interest
in the firm, and attach a firm asset prior to levy by a firm creditor,
he will nevertheless be displaced by a later levy by a firm creditor.189
187 See text pp. 628-630 supra.
188 See Hawkins v. Lasley, 40 Ohio St. 37, 38 (1883).
S89 Page v. Thomas, 43 Ohio St. 38, 1 N.E. 79 (1885).
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Thus in a competition between separate and partnership creditors
at law as to individual assets, the priority is first come first served;
but as to partnership assets, the priority always favors the partner-
ship creditor.
It is only in cases of insolvency that conflicts of this type become
real, and then it is virtually always that this issue will go before a
court of equity. At first glance the maxim that "equity follows the
law" would seem to foreshadow the recognition of priorities in
equity similar to those obtainable by proceedings at law, and in
fact a few jurisdictions have consistently followed this principle.190
As will be seen, Ohio courts have diverged from it markedly.
Subject to the proposition that any legal liens already validly
obtained will be left undisturbed, 191 the courts of equity in this
state have proceeded to lay down their own sequence of priorities.
The starting point is the fact that at law firm creditors can reach
two funds, and separate creditors but one. From this is evolved "a
corresponding and correlative rule giving a preference to the indi-
vidual creditors of a partner in his separate property."'192  This
accomplishes a relegation of partnership creditors to the surplus
assets of the partners-debtors remaining after all individual ob-
ligations have been satisfied. In theory this subordinates a firm
creditor as to separate assets just as at law a separate creditor is
already subordinated as to partnership assets. A parallel form of
expression is also found in the decisions: that each partner has in
equity a right that firm assets be applied to firm debts before his
own are approached; that since a firm creditor may appropriate the
rights of his debtors, he has acquired "derivatively" this same
priority.1 8 Creditors of separate partners are thereupon given by
equity a comparable right that separate assets shall be first used for
the satisfaction of separate debts. Clearly, it would hardly be
accurate to say that the final result disregards the relative rights of
firm and separate creditors at law, for it is based squarely upon
disapproval of those very priorities. More properly, it is an adjust-
ment deliberately improvised to accomplish a result which equity
courts regard as more desirable in terms of equality of distribution
190 E. g., Robinson v. Security Co., 87 Conn. 268, 87 Atl. 879 (1913);
Bardwell v. Perry, 19 Vt. 292 (1847); Freeport Stone Co. v. Carey, 42 W. Va.
276, 26 S.E. 183 (1896); Pettyjohn v. Woodruff, 86 Va. 478, 10 S.E. 715 (1890);
Blair v. Black, 31 S.C. 346, 9 S.E. 1033 (1889).
19' While there are apparently no Ohio cases on this point, the propo-
sition is well supported at common law in other jurisdictions. E. g., Meech
v. Allen, 17 N.Y. 300 (1858). MEcHEM, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNER-
smP §463 (2d ed. 1920).
'92 Rodgers v. Meranda, 7 Ohio St. 179, 181 (1857).
193 Rodgers v. Meranda, supra note 192; Miller v. Estill, 5 Ohio St. 508
(1856).
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of remedy between the two groups of creditors. Thus has evolved
what has become known, not too inaptly, as "the jingle rule,"-that
since partnership creditors have priority in partnership assets, so
should separate creditors have priority in the separate assets of
their debtor-partner, and that each type of creditor has a residuary
right to any surplus remaining in the other's fund.1
9 4
The Act has accepted this principle for the marshalling of assets
as between firm and separate creditors. 195 It deals with the normal
situation where the property of both the firm and its members is
before the court for distribution; allocates priority in firm property
to firm creditors, in separate property to separate creditors, "saving
the rights of lien or secured creditors as heretofore." 196 The word
partnership "assets" is not used, this having been previously defined
as including both property and such contributions of partners as
may be necessary to pay firm debts.'97 Thus, as at common law, the
partners' duty to contribute is not included among the "property"
to be distributed to firm creditors.19 A further section marshalls the
priorities against the property of an insolvent partner in the order
of separate creditors, partnership creditors and partners "by way of
contribution." 199 In brief then, outside of one minor exception to the
194 Rodgers v. Meranda, supra note 192.
195 TnE ACT § 40 (h). This was not, however, without the misgivings
of the Act's draftsman who felt compelled to yield in this respect more to
expediency, in view of its wide judicial acceptance, than to logic. Lewis,
The Uniform Partnership Act, A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29 HARV. L.
REv. 291, 306 (1916).
196 TnE ACT § 40 (h).
197 TiE ACT § 40 (a).
198 TuE ACT § 40(h). As indicated in the text, the definition of part-
nership assets does include the right of contributions which the respective
partners have as an asset of the partnership. THE ACT § 40 (a). In view,
however, of the fact that that right is not property for the purpose of
marshalling among creditors, the only practical result of calling the right
to contribution a partnership asset is to make certain that a partnership is
not insolvent for bankruptcy purposes where there is one solvent partner.
The cases under the bankruptcy act were divided on this subject before
the passage of the Act. Holding that all partners must be insolvent before
the partnership was insolvent in the bankruptcy sense: Vaccaro v. Security
Bank of Memphis, 103 Fed. 436 (C.C.A. 6th 1900); In re Forbes, 128 Fed.
137 (D. Mass. 1904); Davis v. Stevens, 104 Fed. 235 (D.S.D. 1900); In re
Blair, 99 Fed. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1900); see Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695, 700
(1913). Contra: In re Bertenshaw, 157 Fed. 363 (C.C.A. 8th 1907); In re
Everybody's Market, 173 Fed. 492 (D. Okla. 1908); In re McMurtrey & Smith,
142 Fed. 853 (W.D. Texas 1905).
199 THE ACT § 40 (i). In this connection it is to be noted that this same
scheme of priorities is applied in connection with the liability of a deceased
partner's individual property for partnership debts. Section 36 (4) provides
that separate creditors have a priority over firm creditors in such individual
property.
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operation of the marshalling rules in Ohio,20 0 the Act restates the
basic principle long recognized here in respect to the relative pri-
orities of firm and separate creditors competing for satisfaction
of their claims in equity.
In the foregoing discussion, it has been assumed that the part-
nership whose property is in distribution is actual in the sense dis-
cussed earlier-that the indicia of agency and profit sharing are in
fact present. But in the event the firm exists only on the theory of
estoppel-that by virtue of an appearance of partnership for which
certain persons are responsible and on which a creditor relied, these
persons, are precluded from denying that they are partners-the
application of these principles becomes more difficult.
-There is some authority at common law to the effect that
creditors of such an apparent partnership can claim priority over
separate creditors in property apparently devoted to partnership
purposes to the same extent as though the partnership in fact ex-
isted.2 0 1 The Act specifically repudiates such a possibility,202 and
approaches the problem from the factual viewpoint that as between
the alleged partners there is no partnership, and that the liability of
the alleged partners to third persons is based solely on policy. Con-
sequently, this theory continues, the separate creditors who have
extended credit to the alleged partners on the basis of property
which as a matter of fact has not been devoted to any partnership,
should not be forced to stand by while persons who were misled
into believing that the property was partnership property take the
first and perhaps the only bite out of the property. Thus the net
effect of this view is that creditors whose claims against the firm
rest solely on estoppel never acquire the priorities given by the Act
to partnership creditors.
Before leaving the general problem of marshalling assets of
an actual partnership, note should be taken of the peculiar position
200 The Ohio courts have held that where there are no firm assets
and no living solvent partners, the reason for the "jingle rule" disappears,
and firm creditors have a right to share ratably with the separate creditors
in the individual assets of the insolvent partners. Grosvenor v. Austin, 6
Ohio 104 (1833); Brock v. Bateman, 25 Ohio St. 609 (1874). The Bank-
ruptcy Rule was contra. Farmer's Bank v. Ridge Ave. Bank, 240 U.S. 498
(1915). The Act adopts the Bankruptcy Rule in Section 40(i).
201 Thayer v. Humphrey, 91 Wis. 276, 64 N.W. 1007 (1895). Contra:
Broadway Nat. Bank v. Wood, 165 Mass. 312, 43 N.E. 100 (1896); John-
son v. Williams, 111 Va. 95, 68 S.E. 410 (1910). There is little Ohio
authority of significance. In Meridian Nat. Bank v. McConica, 8 Ohio C.C.
442, 457, 40 Ohio C.D. 106 (1894) the court stated, "So far as the respective
rights of creditors are concerned, to hold it partnership property, there
must be a partnership in fact." But see dictum to the contrary in Paddock
Overmeyer & Co. v. Daggett, 9 Ohio Dec. 371 (C.P. 1899).
202 § 16. Commissioners' Note, 7 UN~om LAws ANN. 25 (1938).
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of a partner who is himself either a creditor or debtor of the firm.
If he is a creditor, he or his separate creditors through him may
seek to share with firm creditors in the partnership property. If,
on the other hand, he is indebted to the firm, the firm may seek to
compete with separate creditors in the individual assets of the
debtor-partner. The courts at common law do not permit this in
either instance. This is on the theory that to allow either the part-
ner, where he is a creditor of the firm, or his separate creditors
through him to share in the partnership property would permit a
debtor to compete with his own creditors.2 0 3 Moreover, even though
a partner who has loaned money to his partnership is entitled to
contribution from his co-partner, such a partner is not permitted to
share equally with a firm's creditors in the surplus assets of a co-
partner's individual assets; but must stand by with recourse only
against the surplus remaining after their claims have been satis-
fied.204
Conversely, where a partner is a debtor of his firm, the firm
cannot claim against the debtor-partner's individual estate in com-
petition with that partner's separate creditors. That again is on the
theory that it would permit the debtor-partner as a member of the
firm to compete with his own separate creditors.
20 5
Section 40 (i) of the Act accepts these common-law principles
but makes two variations not previously commented upon. Thus,
the Act does not permit a partner who has paid all the partnership
debts to share with separate creditors in the assets of the individual
co-partners. While such sharing is permitted at common law,2 0 6 in-
directly this amounts to a denial of the usual rule that separate
creditors are first in the individual assets. This is true because the
partner's claim is in reality attributable to his having paid claims
that firm creditors could not themselves have advanced successfully
in competition with individual creditors. The Act merely extends
to this peculiar circumstance the general principle already well es-
tablished.
The remaining variation concerns the right of a partner to com-
pete with individual creditors of a co-partner as to a claim that is
disrelated to partnership affairs. Unlike the common law, 20 7 the Act
permits such a claim to be asserted in competition with individual
creditors.2 0 8 This solution sharpens the distinction between claims
203 Rodgers v. Meranda, 7 Ohio St. 179 (1857).
2 0  MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 457 (2d ed. 1920).
205 Id. at § 456.
206 While there are no Ohio cases, the usual common-law rule was
apparently contra. MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSH=P § 456
(2d ed. 1920).
20 7 MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 451 (2d ed. 1920).
208 THE ACT § 40 (i).
[Vol. 9
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
related and those not related to the firm business and places a part-
ner who holds the former type on a parity with other individual
creditors. Also, since his claim is properly an asset of his separate
estate which his own separate creditors, in event of his insolvency,
may wish to assert, this rule preserves their right to appropriate it.
The draftsman of the Act, Mr. Lewis, has pointed out that the com-
mon-law rule identified such a claim with firm assets and in effect
took it from the creditor-partner's personal estate and allocated it to
the satisfaction of firm creditors. 20 9
One major problem remains, even after firm claims have been
paid. This concerns the respective rights of the partners among
themselves. By hypothesis, debts owed by the firm to individual
partners will have been paid. Ordinarily, these are called advances
and one Ohio case has intimated these will carry interest.210 Since
they are firm debts, they must be borne equally by each partner,
including the one making the advance.2 11 The repayment of capital
contributions is next in order.2 12 This too is a firm obligation to be
borne jointly by all. No interest is allowed. 213 Finally, deficiencies
in either classification are shared in the same proportion as other
losses, presumptively in the ratio agreed on for sharing profits. 14
In the event one or more partner is out of the jurisdiction or insol-
vent at least one Ohio case has required the remainder to bear his
share.21 5
Except for adding the right to interest on capital contributions,
the Act affirms all these principles. It allows interest on both capi-
tal and advances 216 and requires contribution from solvent partners
within the jurisdiction of the court to make up the shares of others
who fail or are unable for various reasons to contribute their pro
rata part.21 7 Furthermore, the Act provides that an assignee for the
benefit of creditors or any person appointed by the court shall have
the right to enforce contributions. 218
The principles that have just been discussed have all been based
on the premise that the partners have not attempted themselves to
solve their own problems by applying firm assets in various ways
209 Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criti-
cism, 29 HAxv. L. Rsv. 291, 308 (1916).
210 Wayne v. Hinkle, 9 Ohio Dec. Rep. 389 (Super. Ct. 1887).
2 11 iEcM, EM mENSrs OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP §§ 469,470 '(2d ed.
1920).
212 Id. at § 469.
213 Wayne v. Hinkle, 9 Ohio Dec. Rep. 389 (1887).
21- Wischmeyer v. Siebeneck, 46 Ohio App. 486, 189 N.E. 509 (1933).
2151 Ibid.
216 Advances, Section 18 (c). Capital from date repayment should be
made, Section 18 (d).217 THE ACT § 40 (d).
218 T=I ACT § 40 (e).
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to resolving their difficulties. Thus, they may have conveyed them
to particular firm creditors, to their individual creditors or to them-
selves, or they may have conveyed their individual assets to credi-
tors of the firm. Partners may not, of course, make conveyances
that are fraudulent; nor may they establish preferences between
creditors in contemplation of insolvency. 19 The Act does not touch
these matters, and in consequence they are not dealt with here.220
DISSOLUTION INTER VIVOS
It is of course a familiar principle that the term "dissolution" is
used in the decisions as descriptive of a change in the relationship
of partners that ultimately culminates in termination of the enter-
prise.221 It is the beginning of the end, but not the end itself, in
that a substantial group of agency powers persist beyond dissolution.
Only when these powers have actually ceased, can the enterprise
be said to have fully terminated. Put differently, the ordinary au-
thorities characteristic of a going concern persist until dissolution;
thereafter a less extensive group of authorities, characteristic of a
winding up process only, continues until that process is completed.
222
Section 30 of the Act restates this with admirable clarity.
Ohio and other jurisdictions indicate that dissolution may occur
in three ways: by acts of the partners themselves, by events, and by
judicial decree. All three are preserved in the Act. Thus, both at
common law and under the Act a partnership at will may be dis-
solved rightfully at any time;222 a partnership for a term may also
be dissolved at any time, but subject to a cause of action for wrong-
ful dissolution if the term is still pending.22 The occurrence of
219 OHio GEN. CODE §§ 8618 and 11104 (1938).
220 The Act was criticized for leaving the problem of fraudulent con-
veyances in a state of confusion. Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act, A
Criticism, 28 HAv. L REV. 726, 774 (1915). The answer given was that the
problem would be met in a Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act which the
Commissioners then had under consideration. Lewis, The Uniform Part-
nership Act, A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29 HARv. L. REV. 291, 296
(1916). Such an Act has been prepared in fact and covers fraudulent con-
veyances as applied to partnerships. UNIFORm FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
ACT, 9 Umoiu-w LAWS ANx. 327 (1938). That Act is the subject of another
article in the current issue of this Journal. Reference is made thereto for
a discussion of the application of fraudulent conveyances to partnerships.
Rose and Hunsinger, Transfers in Fraud of Creditors, Ohio Law and The
Uniform Act, page 571 supra.
221 See Palmer v. Dodge, 4 Ohio St. 21, 29 (1854).
222 Ibid.
223 See Eagle v. Bucher, 6 Ohio St. 296, 301 (1856). THE ACT § 31(1) (b).
224 Cockley v. Brucker, 54 Ohio St. 214, 44 N.E. 590 (1896). But see
Durbin v. Barber, 14 Ohio 311, 315 (1846). THE AcT § 31(2). At common
law a few American jurisdictions held that a partnership for a term could
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certain events may be so inconsistent with continuance of the enter-
prise as to constitute a dissolution by operation of law. Examples
are death or bankruptcy of a partner, conveyance of a partner's in-
terest, and assignment for benefit of creditors. There are Ohio
decisions or dicta supporting each.0 5 In other states, illegality of the
enterprise and war between the countries of which the partners are
citizens will do the same,2 6 although Ohio material is lacking here.
The Act mentions all but two of these-war and assignments for
creditors-and, except for conveyance of a partner's interest, pro-
vides that the occurrence of each of these shall constitute a dissolu-
tion.227 The problems raised by the provision that "a conveyance
by a partner of his interest does not of itself dissolve the partner-
ship," have been discussed and the conclusion already drawn that
while conveyance unaccompanied by a withdrawal does not dis-
solve, an act of withdrawal does, and that the legal consequences
of either type of conveyance differ from the common law in only
one substantial respect-the application of firm assets.228
The third manner of dissolution relates to those acts for which
a court of equity will grant dissolution. These are instances wherein
the partnership is for a fixed time or a specific undertaking but con-
tinuance would not be profitable or desirable. Incapacity, insanity,
misconduct and impossibility of success are stated to be grounds
for judicial dissolution at common law.129 They are also causes for
judicial dissolution under the Act.280
Dissolution, once it occurs by any of these means, reduces the
partnership scope to those functions that relate only to winding up
the concern. This is true both under present Ohio decisions and un-
der the Act.23 ' But the mere fact of dissolution is not in all cases
enough in itself to accomplish this effect either as to partners or as
to third persons. In many, some variety of notice is a condition
precedent.
At common law it is ordinarily said that where dissolution is
not be dissolved. MECEm, ELEMENTS OF THE LAw op PARTNIPssp § 357
(2d ed. 1920).
225 In re Gurnea, 111 Ohio St. 715, 146 N.E. 308 (1924) (death); see
H. B. Clafflin Co. v. Evans, 55 Ohio St. 183, 191, 45 N.E. 3 (1896) (convey-
ance of a partner's interest; assignment for benefit of creditors); Hamilton
v. Cutler, 9 Ohio Dec. Rep. 187, 188 (Super. Ct. 1884) (bankruptcy). Dis-
solution by death is discussed at length below. See text pp. 657-661 infra.
226 MECI M, ELEumTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHiP § 370 (2d ed. 1920)
(illegality); Sutherland v. Mayer, 271 U.S. 272 (1926) (war).
227TBE ACT § 31.
228 See text page 643 supra.
229 Durbin v. Barber, 14 Ohio 311 (1846); MECHEM, ELEMENrS OF THE
LAW OF PARTNERsHnp §§ 376, 377, 380 (2d ed. 1920).2
3
0 THE ACT § 32(1).
281 Palmer v. Dodge, 4 Ohio St. 21 (1854). THE ACT § 33.
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by act of a partner, as distinguished from an event (operation of
law), or a judicial decree, notice must be given both to co-partners
and to any third persons who have previously relied on the firm's
credit.232 The former notice is for the purpose of terminating the
agency in fact; the latter is in order to prevent operation of the doc-
trine of estoppel. There are then two factors to consider-the man-
ner of dissolution in the sense of the act, event, or decree, and the
person as to whom it is to be effective. This latter factor is further
broken down in respect to third persons at common law into vari-
ous gradations dependent upon the nature of the third person's prior
reliance or knowledge as to the credit or personnel of the partner-
ship.
Under the Act these classifications are preserved, but the rights
and duties have in certain respects been modified. Thus under the
Act in the case of a co-partner, no notice at all is required if disso-
lution is by judicial decree; but if it is by act, bankruptcy, or death
of a partner, then the partner purporting to execute his authority
must have had knowledge, if dissolution occurred by act; or must
have had either knowledge or notice if by death or bankruptcy.2 3
Otherwise his co-partners are liable for their pro rata share of lia-
bility as if the partnership had not been dissolved. This is contrary
to the present Ohio view where knowledge of a co-partner is neces-
sary in case of dissolution by act, but not in the case of death or
bankruptcy. 234 On the other hand the act requires no notice in case
of dissolution because of illegality. 235
In the case of third persons, it is obvious both at common law
and under the Act that a partner has actual authority to bind his
co-partners as to winding up activities; but the Act further provides
232 Eagle v. Bucher, 6 Ohio St. 296 (1856); Myers v. Standart, 11 Ohio
St. 29 (1860); see Palmer v. Dodge, 4 Ohio St. 21, 29 (1854).
233THE ACT § 34. Section 3 of the Act defines the terms "knowledge"
and "notice". "Knowledge" is defined to include not only actual knowledge
but also knowledge of such other facts under the circumstances as shows
bad faith. "Notice" means that the person who claims the benefit thereof
states the fact to the person to be notified or delivers through the mail, or
by other means of communication, a written statement of the fact to such
person or to a proper person at the place of business or residence of the
person to be notified.
234 As to knowledge in case of dissolution by act, see note 232 supra.
As to knowledge or notice in case of dissolution by death or bankruptcy, see
Easton v. Ellis, 1 Hand. 70, 12 Ohio Dec. Rep. 32, 34 (Super. Ct. 1854).
The Act's provision as to this, note 233, supra, is in line with the famous
Ohio case of Ish v. Crane, 13 Ohio St. 574 (1862) where it was held that
death of the principal did not terminate an agency where neither the agent
nor the third person had knowledge or notice of the death, and where the
act is one "not necessarily to be done in the name of the principal."
235 THE ACT §§ 33, 34, 35 (1) (b) & (3) (a).
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that this authority extends to "any transaction which would bind
the partnership if dissolution had not taken place," in cases where
the third person has extended credit to the firm before dissolution
and has had no knowledge or notice of it.230 Even where he has not
extended credit, the third person is entitled to publication in a news-
paper if he has so much as heard of the partnership prior to dis-
solution.23 7 These two categories of creditors are both recognized in
Ohio decisions; but while knowledge or notice is required in the case
of a so-called old customer, 218 the only requirement as to a new one
who has previously heard of the firm is a reasonable effort to give
notice.23 9 The case of a dormant or secret partner is dealt with under
the Act just as at common law; no notice of dissolution to third per-
sons is required of such a partner.21
It has long been a common-law principle that on dissolution all
partners have equally the right and duty, unless agreed otherwise,
to participate in the winding up activities. 241 The Act affirms this
but excludes any partners who have been responsible for a wrongful
dissolution.24 2 It has also been well established by the decisions
that each partner on dissolution has the right, referred to earlier,
to insist that partnership property be applied to the payment of
partnership obligations before any of it is distributed to the partners
or used to pay their separate debts.243 This is really in the nature
of a remedy in equity though it has come to be known misleadingly
as the partner's "lien." This too is recognized under the Act, but
with an added specification not found in the decisions, that the dis-
tribution of any surplus in partnership property, not needed for pay-
ment of firm debts, shall be paid each partner in cash.2 44 In the case
of a partnership for a term, the Act distinguishes between partners
286TE ACT §§ 33, 35 (1) (b).
237THE ACT § 35(1) (b) (11). The Act again makes no distinction be-
tween acts of partners and events as the basis of dissolution. In both types,
knowledge or notice is required, Sections 33 and 35 (1) (b) save in case of
illegality or where the third person deals with the partner who is bankrupt.
§ 35(3) (a) and (b). At common law, creditors were only entitled to notice
when the dissolution was by act of partners, see note 232 supra, not when
dissolution occurred by operation of law. Easton v. Ellis, 12 Ohio Dec. Rep.
32 (Super. Ct. 1854).
238Myers v. Standart, 11 Ohio St. 29 (1860); see Palmer v. Dodge, 4
Ohio St. 21, 29 (1854).
239 Schneider v. Stern, 4 Ohio C.C.(N.S.) 55, 44 Ohio C.D. 75 (1905);
Crosier v. McNeal, 17 Ohio C.C. 644, 6 Ohio C.D. 748 (1895).
240 See McFarland v. McHugh, 12 Ohio C.C. 485, 488, 5 Ohio C.D. 546,
548 (1891). TBE AcT§ 35 (2).
241 Palmer v. Dodge, 4 Ohio St. 21 (1854).
242THE AcT§ 37.
24 Greene v. Greene, 1 Ohio 535 (1824); Sumner v. Hampson, 8 Ohio
328 (1838); Miller v. Estill, 5 Ohio St. 508 (1856).244,THE ACT § 38(1). See note 108 supra.
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who have wrongfully brought about a dissolution and those who
have fully observed the partnership agreement, giving the latter as
at common law a cause of action against the former for breach of
the articles 246 and permitting them to continue the business during
the balance of the term with a right of possession of partnership
property on tender of a bond approved by the court protecting the
wrongdoer as to his interest less his liability in damages.2 6 Ohio
decisions do not indicate any such practice today. The Act adds
that a partner who has wrongly dissolved may have the balance of
his distributive share determined and paid him in cash whereupon
he is released from all partnership liabilities. He is deprived, how-
ever, of any share in the value of partnership good will. 47 Credi-
tors of the old firm, as in cases discussed earlier, remain creditors
of the continuing partnership.
24 8
These provisions are essentially consistent with the present
Ohio decisions. As pointed out, they supplement these, however,
with certain details not yet passed upon here, add a regulatory de-
vice by way of bond, and protect creditors of the earlier firm in a
way not found at common law. These contributions would appear
to be in the interest of completeness, clarity, and stability of the
partnership enterprise in the face of the emergency of dissolution
in violation of the partnership agreement.
While at common law a partnership agreement could be re-
scinded because of fraud or misrepresentation of one of the parties,
the rights of the partners who elected to rescind on these grounds
were not detailed. The Act defines these rights with some pre-
cision.2 49
Finally, it is more explicit than the common law as to when
after dissolution a partner's right to an account accrues. It fixes
this at the date of dissolution.251 Problems concerning the applica-
tion of the Statute of Limitations are thus clarified.
DISSOLUTION BY DEATH
There are several aspects of the dissolution of a partnership by
death of a partner that justify treatment apart from the more gen-
eral discussions of dissolution from other causes. To begin with,
the nature of the partnership relation accounts for certain legal con-
sequences not found elsewhere. Partnership has been seen to be
245 Cockley v. Brucker, 54 Ohio St. 214, 44 N.E. 590 (1896). THE ACT
§ 38 (2) (a).
246 THE ACT § 38 (2) (b).
247 THE ACT § 38(2) (c).
248 THE ACT § 41 (5). See text page 643 supra.
2 49 THE ACT § 39.
250 THE ACT § 43.
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but a branch of the larger law of agency, and it is familiar knowl-
edge that except for the case of a power coupled with an interest,
25
'
death terminates the authority of an agent. -2 52 Further, the joint as-
pects of this partnership relation by definition include the concept
of survivorship. The first of these principles would seem necessarily
to destroy all winding-up powers that might otherwise have been
exercised by the representative of the deceased partner; the second
precludes the latter's estate from acquiring an interest in any of the
partnership property. Finally, unlike any other aspect of dissolu-
tion, the Ohio statutes have explicitly dealt with dissolution by
death. It is a combination then of these three factors that prompts
separate treatment of what otherwise would be only one of many
types of dissolution.253
The common law recognizes that upon dissolution by death of a
partner, the surviving partners have the right and duty to possess
the partnership property to the exclusion of the legal representative
of the deceased partner for the purpose of winding up affairs of the
firm.25 4 Upon the death of the last surviving partner, his legal repre-
sentative has this right and duty.25 5 In either case, while the wind-
ing up partner has fiduciary responsibilities, he has only such au-
thority as a similar partner would have in the case of dissolution
inter vivos. He has, in other words, no authority to impose upon
either his co-partner or the estate of the deceased partner new obli-
gations characteristic of a going enterprise. 256 Patently, in the ab-
sence of special powers by contract or will, the representative has
no authority of any sort to bind the survivors. At the same time
prior firm obligations, with the exception of certain contracts per-
sonal to the deceased partner, are not terminated by death. Rather,
they persist as to all obligors, including, where they are joint and
251 Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 174 (U.S. 1823); see Easton v. Ellis,
12 Ohio Dec. Rep. 32, 35 (Super. Ct. 1854).
252 See Akron & C. J. R. R. v. Weedman, 83 Ohio St. 88, 96, 93 N.E. 528,
530 (1910). But if neither the agent nor the third person has notice of the
death of the principal, and the act is one "not necessarily to be done in the
name of principal," the contract made by the agent with the third person
will be binding on the estate of the principal. Ish v. Crane, 13 Ohio St.
574 (1862).
253The question of authority of remaining partners in absence of
knowledge or notice of the death of one partner and the question of notice
to third parties upon dissolution by death has been discussed in the text
pp. 653-655 supra.
254 Lockwood v. Mitchell, 7 Ohio St. 387 (1857); Stewart v. Grant, 24
Ohio L. Abs. 281 (App. 1937).
255 Dayton v. Bartlett, 38 Ohio St. 357 (1882).
256Kreis v. Gorton, 23 Ohio St. 468, 472 (1872).
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several, the estate of the deceased partner.257 If the business of the
partnership is continued by the surviving partner without agree-
ment or provision therefor in the will, the estate of the deceased is
entitled to profits earned by use of firm property in the interval
between dissolution and final settlement;258 or the representative
may elect in lieu thereof to take interest on the value of the de-
cedent's share even though no profits are made;259 and he may pro-
ceed in equity to obtain an accounting to ascertain the interest of the
deceased in the old partnership. 260
It should be noted finally that at common law partners may in
contemplation of death enter into agreements subjecting their per-
sonal estate at death to varying degrees of partnership liability.
Similarly this may be done unilaterally by will. In either event a
characteristic provision is to subject the decedent's interest in the
firm, or some announced portion of his separate estate, to post mor-
tem obligations incurred by the survivors. 261 While this effort will
not succeed in preventing dissolution, it will serve to impose unique
liabilities to firm creditors and may, if so intended, create rights in
the representative to share in the profits without necessarily becom-
ing a partner..2
62
These, it should be noted, are substantive rights. The Ohio
statutes relating to dissolution of a partnership by death do not dis-
place them. They do, however, set up an elaborate procedure for
their use and regulation.
Thus the right of survivors to wind up is preserved, in that upon
appointment of the representative of the estate of the deceased part-
ner, the survivors are required to apply at once to the probate court
for appointment of appraisers for partnership assets and a schedule
of partnership debts.263 In fact, if persons entitled fail to request
probate of the decedent's estate, the survivor may himself apply.2 4
On the other hand, if it is the survivor who fails to apply as to
settlement of partnership accounts then, unlike the common law,
the decedent's representative is entitled to apply.26' Further, if
257 See Weil v. Guerin, 42 Ohio St. 299, 302 (1884); Burgoyne v. Ohio
L. Ins. & T. Co., 5 Ohio St. 586, 587 (1855). See note 81 supra and text
thereto. The surviving partner in absence of special circumstances may not
at common law charge compensation for his services in winding up the
partnership. Cameron v. Francisco, 26 Ohio St. 190 (1875). The Act per-
mits such compensation by Section 18 (f).
256 See Cameron v. Francisco, 26 Ohio St. 190, 194 (1875).
259 MEcHEM, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 407 (2d ed. 1920).
26o Cameron v. Francisco, 26 Ohio St. 190 (1875).
261 Peters v. Campbell, 2 Ohio Dec. Rep. 526 (C.P. 1861).
262 McGrath v. Cowen, 57 Ohio St. 385, 49 N.E. 338 (1898).
263 OHIO GEN. CODE § 8085 (1938).
264 OHIo GEN. CODE § 8087 (1938).
265 OHIO GEN. CODE § 8088 (1938).
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the representative assents and the court approves, the survivor may
elect to purchase the interest of the decedent in the partnership at
the appraised value less his share of partnership debts and liabili-
ties.26 6 In fact, if he fails to do so, he loses his'common-law right as
successor in interest and the representative is duty bound to apply
for a receiver to wind up the firm business himself.267
Election by the survivor to buy the decedent's interest sets in
operation a series of steps calculated to bring to light and settle all
firm obligations, and to entitle the survivor ultimately to take over
all the rights of the former firm. 2 8 In the case of real estate owned
by the partnership, some portion of the legal title to which was in
the decedent, the statute expressly states that only such as is used
in whole or in part in the transaction of firm business shall be con-
sidered partnership property for the purpose of conveyance to the
survivor.2 09 This provision, it should be noted, limits firm realty to
that actually used in the business as compared with the broader
classification discussed earlier. 7 0 Finally, it should be pointed out
that the statute recognizes the validity of provisions in contracts and
wills setting forth other and different modes of settlement and dis-
tribution.2 7 1
This brief survey shows the Ohio substantive law to be essen-
tially the product of courts, not of the legislature. It also shows
that the procedural aspects of settlement of the affairs of both the
partnership and the deceased partner, are now subject to compre-
hensive statutory coverage. When we turn now to the Act, it is this
distinction that permits a ready statement that the Act contemplates
virtually no change of substance in the present state of Ohio law.
This is true because the Act is substantive in nature and its pro-
visions are essentially embodiments of Ohio substantive principle.
Moreover, for the same reason, the procedural provisions of the Ohio
statutes are not in any way touched by the Act. Only one section-
and that because it is substantive in nature-is affected.
In Section 26 (2) (d) of the Act it is provided that upon the
death of a partner, his right in specific partnership property vests
in the surviving partner or partners, except where the deceased was
the last surviving partner, in which event his right in such prop-
266 Oxzo GEN. CODE § 8089 (1938).
287 OIo GEN. CODE § 8091 (1938). See Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carnahan,
63 Ohio St. 258, 266, 58 N.E. 805, 807 (1900). The same result is rendered if
the legal representative of the deceased partner refuses to consent to the
purchase by the survivor. Weitz v. Weitz, 15 Ohio App. 134 (1921).
288 OHIo GEN. CODE §§ 8093, 8095, 8096, 8097, 8098 (1938). See Phoenix
Ins. Co. v. Carnahan, 63 Ohio St. 258, 265, 58 N.E. 805, 807 (1900).
288 OHIo GEN CoDE § 8098 (1938).
270 See text pp. 633-635, supra.
271 OHmo GEN. CODE § 8092 (1938).
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erty vests in his legal representative. The property is to be used
by such survivors only for partnership purposes. As we have seen,
these are the common-law rules. Surviving partners have the right
to wind up the partnership but under Section 37 the legal repre-
sentative of a deceased partner may obtain winding up by the court.
It could possibly be argued that this last section is inconsistent with
the existing statutory method of settling a deceased partner's af-
fairs since it apparently permits the surviving partner to wind up
the affairs of a partnership without submission to the court and in-
dependent of a receiver unless the legal representative prevails
upon a court to intervene. This section, however, is very broad.
It is doubtful whether its later enactment would repeal the detailed
procedure existing at present for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased partner. Furthermore, the right granted by Section 37 is
one that apparently exists even now at common law along with the
statutory procedure, in the event the procedure provided by Ohio
General Code Sections 8085 to 8098 has not been followed.
272
Section 41 (1) of the Act provides that if a partnership is con-
tinued upon the assignment of the deceased partner's interest, the
creditors of the old firm are creditors of the new firm. Section 41
(3) provides for the same result if the legal representative of the
estate does not assign but consents to the continuation. This section
is not designed to affect the rights of surviving partners as against
the estate of the deceased partner or vice versa, but merely to pro-
tect creditors of the old firm.2 12 The representative of the deceased
is not required to assign or consent. If the articles or the will of
the deceased so provide, this right to assign or consent is already
recognized under Section 8092 of the Ohio General Code. Further-
more, it appears to be an unobjectionable procedure, even under the
existing Ohio statutes, for the legal representative to consent to the
continuance of the firm if it is in the best interests of the estate,
even in the absence of a provision in the articles or will.2 7 4
Section 42 accords a representative of the estate the right to
obtain interest on his deceased's share in the partnership where
the business is continued by the surviving partners in accordance
with Section 41. In lieu thereof he may elect profits. As we have
seen, this was the common-law rule and it existed along with the
272 Stewart v. Grant, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 281 (App. 1937).
273 M. & C. Creditors Corp. v. Pratt, 172 Misc. 695, 17 N.Y.S. 2d 240
(1938), aff'd, 255 App. Div. 838, 17 N.Y.S. 2d 662 (1938), appeal denied, 255
App. Div. 962, 17 N.Y.S. 2d 990 (1938), aff'd, 281 N.Y. 804, 24 N.E. 2d 482
(1940); Blumer Brewing Corp. v. Mayer, 223 Wis. 540, 269 N.W. 693 (1936).
2
7
-Stewart v. Grant, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 281 (App. 1937).
[Vol. 9
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
statutory method of settling the share of the deceased partner.2 75
It is not therefore inconsistent with the statute.
Curiously enough, it seems that the only inconsistency between
the Ohio statute and the Act in this connection is found in the very
last sentence of the last section of the statute. It will be recalled
that Ohio courts of equity have recognized two types or degrees
of conversion of partnership real estate, sub modo and out and out.
2 7
The language of the statute as to conveyance of the interest of a
deceased partner in partnership real estate describes only the latter
type. Thus Section 8098 only contemplates the giving of a deed to
the surviving partner of real estate purchased by partnership funds
where the real estate has been actually used by the partnership.
This limitation on the Ohio common law is also contrary to Section
8 (2) of the Act to the effect that partnership property includes all
property purchased with partnership funds. Section 8098 would
seem to present no problem unless title to real estate purchased with
partnership funds but not used by the partnership had been taken
in the name of the partners, either separately or jointly. Then,
though the surviving partners could by a conveyance in the partner-
ship name transfer an equitable title, it would take an act of the
legal representative or the administering court to convey the legal
title. It would therefore seem desirable to repeal the last sentence of
Section 8098 regardless of adoption of the Act.
SUMMVARY OF EFFECTS OF ADOPTION OF ACT UPON EXISTING OHIO
JUDICIAL AND STATUTORY LAW
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that in major part
the Act is but a restatement and clarification of Ohio law as it is
found today in decisions and occasional statutes. This is, of course,
hardly surprising when one recalls that its draftsmen fully intended
to adopt existing common-law principles so far as they represented
any considerable body of consistent and generally accepted material.
Ohio, as has been seen, has long been a contributor to this ever ac-
cumulating mass of material. The Act's contribution to this large
area is necessarily, therefore, in terms of clarity and concise state-
ment of principle.
But there remain two major areas in which the Act, if adopted
275 See text page 658, supra. In addition, if the surviving partner in fact
continues the firm, the Act has been interpreted as according the remedies
of Section 42 to the estate of the deceased partner, even though no con-
sent to the continuation of the partnership has been given by the personal
representative of the deceased partner, or by the will of the latter, or by
the partnership articles. Froess v. Froess, 284 Pa. 369, 131 Atl. 276 (1925);
M. & C. Creditor Corp. v. Pratt, note 273, supra.
276 See text pp. 633-634, supra.
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in Ohio, would make affirmative and substantial contribution over
and above this not unimportant matter of clarification. These relate
to the matters of (1) partnership real property and (2) the rights of
creditors.
As a term descriptive of the type of estate enjoyed by partners
in firm property, the Act adopts "tenancy in partnership" and ap-
plies it to both real and personal property. Further, it gives a per-
ceptibly broader connotation to this term than Ohio courts have
previously given to "partnership property", in that the phrase
"property brought into the partnership stock or subsequently
acquired by purchase or otherwise, on account of the partnership"
is more comprehensive than the usual common-law test of purchase
with partnership funds. Moreover, the sum total of various pro-
visions defining a partner's interest in the firm and the rights of
firm and separate creditors, would serve to bring about in Ohio an
abrogation of the existing doctrine of sub modo conversion in equity
and to substitute an out-and-out conversion recognizable in both
equity and law. Finally, the Act's recognition of the right to convey
title to and from the firm in its firm name is an obvious practical
convenience as is the provision abolishing dower in "a partner's
interest in specific partnership property."
In the second area, that of creditors' rights, the Act establishes
a consistent set of provisions substantially more protective of these
rights than can be found in Ohio law today. This is outstandingly
true where the partnership is continued without liquidation even
though a technical dissolution has taken place. Under those cir-
cumstances, creditors of the old firm and of the new firm will share
equally in all the assets of the new firm. Further, unlike common
law, old customers are entitled by the Act to knowledge or notice
in cases of dissolution by bankruptcy or death, and new customers
are entitled at least to newspaper notice of dissolution. Both pro-
visions are a protection to firm creditors. The charging order pro-
vision in the Act gives clarity and immeasurably greater security to
the rights of separate creditors who have obtained judgments
against individual partners. At the same time it protects appreciably
the rights of both firm creditors and the partners themselves by
providing a convenient procedure for settling competing interests
without disruption of the firm business. General marshalling
priorities have been retained as now found in Ohio cases with only
occasional variations as to such matters as assets of partnership by
estoppel, a partner's personal non-partnership claim against the
firm, and the Ohio exception where there are neither firm assets
nor solvent living partners-matters actually of rare occurrence in
practice. On the other hand, firm creditors who learn of assumption
of firm debts by less than all partners or by the successors in in-
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terest of retiring partners are required in their dealings with their
iormer joint obligors or their successors to refrain from consenting
to any material alteration as though a principal and surety relation
exists. In this one instance the Act imposes on firm creditors risks
not found in Ohio decisions, but such instances occur but rarely and
the Act reflects the attitude prevailing in courts of other states.
Outside of these two areas there are occasional variations, all
of which have been indicated in earlier discussion. All are minor
and all tend to bring Ohio into conformity with the partnership law
-of other jurisdictions.
In short, should the Act be enacted here, its over-all contribu-
tions to the present state of Ohio law would unquestionably be sig-
nificant. Clarification of existing principles and conformity to the
law of other states are in themselves ample justification for its
adoption. But in the two areas of partnership real property and
-creditors rights the Act would introduce modifications in existing
principles that would both stabilize the enterprise and protect firm
and separate creditors. All these effects are major and all point
persuasively toward enactment of the Uniform Partnership Act in
,Ohio.
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